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FOSTERING DEMOCRACY
IN IRAQ
Tristam E. Niederer, M.A.
Western Michigan University, 2008
This thesis evaluates democracy in Iraq and determines if the current
institutions are fostering democracy. When the institutions in place are not fostering
democracy, I evaluate why they are not and how they could promote democracy. I
employ a case study approach of Iraq by first looking at the region's history. I then
analyze the works of leading experts of democracy in divided society theory to
develop a democratic framework for Iraq. Finally, I focus on the Iraqi government's
institutions and the Iraqi Constitution to evaluate their effectiveness.
The purpose of this thesis is two-fold. First, as a deeply divided society, the
lessons learned in Iraq are valuable for other democracies emerging in divided
societies. The framework for democracy in divided societies that I developed may be
applicable in other countries. Secondly I show how Iraq's past history of authoritarian
rule followed by rebellion and chaos and the eventual emergence of a dictator that can
be avoided through a framework for democracy in its divided society.
In

the

democratic

framework

I

developed,

I

determined

that

autonomy/federalism, power sharing, proportionality and minority rights are
important criteria for a divided society to maintain democracy. Based on these criteria
I conclude that with its current Constitution and formal institutions Iraq is heading in
the wrong direction for creating a stable democracy.
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1
CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Democracy in Iraq

On December 15, 2005, Iraq held a nationwide election to create a new
government. This election, designed to form a parliament, marked the first
democratic elections in the country. In just over two years, the Iraqis drafted a
constitution and held elections to fashion a new government.
Despite these advances towards democracy, Iraq is still failing to manage
the ethnic violence that is destabilizing the country. The sectarian violence is
eroding the democratic process.
The result of the ethnic conflict on Iraq is staggering. According to the
Brookings Institutes 2007 report on Iraq, since the end of official combat in May
2003 until December 2006, the total number of civilians killed by violence of any
kind totals 53-59,000 persons 1 . Further the violence is causing large numbers of
people to be internally displaced. By August of 2007 the number had reached an
estimated 1,205,000 people. These figures reflect the consequences of the war on
the Iraqi people.
If the civilian casualties and displaced people seem to be injurious, the cost
to the infrastructure of the state is equally damaging. Prior to the invasion in April
2003, it was estimated that Iraq's oil production was at 2.5 million barrels of oil
per day. By September 2007, that number had decreased, with production down to

1

http://www3 .brookings.ed u/fp/saban/iraq/index.pdf
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2.33 barrels of oil per day2. The result is $101. 6 billion dollars in oil revenue by
September 2007, up from prewar oil revenue's of $5 billion dollars. However,
while this seems like a major increase, it must be remembered that the price of a
barrel of oil in 2003 was less than half of what it is in 2007. This combined with
the $420 million dollars to repair Iraq's oil infrastructure and the further $1. 7
billion dollars allocated for the maintenance of the oil infrastructure means that
very little has been gained in oil revenues since the invasion3 . Inflation has risen
from 36 percent in 2003 to 50 percent in 2006. While there have been increases in
some areas of infrastructure, many of these increases are insignificant. For
example unemployment numbers in Iraq have consistently hovered between 25-40
percent, down by about 10 percent from June 20034• These statistics are only a few
examples of the toll placed on Iraq by the ethnic violence.
This conflict is due largely to the divisions between Iraq's two Islamic
factions: the majority Shi'a and the minority (but former ruling faction) Sunni.
Further violence between central and southern Arabs and northern Kurds creates
yet another dimension of ethnic conflict.
Managing ethnic conflict will prove to be the most difficult challenge for
Iraq's democracy. The immediate problem for Iraqi political institutions will be to
manage this ethnic violence. What democratic institutions can manage ethnic
conflict in a divided society and still promote and maintain a stable democracy?
Though this applies to Iraq, it also applies to many other divided societies.
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However, given its unique ethnic disparities, whatever is the final outcome for
Iraq's democracy it will be a valuable lesson for other divided societies.
The purpose ofthis thesis is to discuss what Iraqi democratic institutions
can do to quell ethnic violence in a divided society and promote stable democracy.
I will focus specifically on Iraq to get the answer. Do the political institutions
adopted by divided Iraq foster democracy and can thesdnstitutions help stabilize
the ethnic violence in that country? As Mohammed Rabie points out "conflict can
never be eliminated; it can only be managed to minimize its negative impact,
reduce its intensity, and facilitate its positive role in human development" (Rabie
1994, 50). Finding out how to manage conflict democratically is the goal then of
this paper.

A Background to the Problem
In order to comprehend the violence in Iraq, it will be helpful to understand
the social and political situation first. As previously stated, Iraq is a deeply divided
society along three lines: ethnic (Arab and non-Arab); religious (Shi'a and Sunni
Muslim); and economic (oil reserves in the north and south, and sparse agriculture
in the central region). This is the result ofartificially created borders following the
collapse of the Ottoman Empire after World War I, which will be examined in
greater detail in the History chapter. Following this forging ofregions, Iraq
becan1e a state composed of three different regions: Kurdish speaking Sunni and
Shi'a Muslim Kurds in the north, Semitic speaking Sunni Arabs in the central
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region, and Arabic speaking Sunni and Shi'a Muslim Arabs in the south (Polk
2005, 5-6).
The ethnic divides are deep and longstanding. 75-80 percent of the country
is compromised of Arabs in the central-southern region, while a sizeable Kurdish
population (15-20 percent) resides in the north. The remaining 5 percent of the
country is composed of Turkoman, Assyrian and other groups in the northern
region (BBC: Country Profile Iraq 14/11/06).
Iraq's religious divide occurs between the Arabic speaking Sunni Muslims
and the Arabic speaking Shi'a Muslims. The Shi'a resides mainly in the south,
while the Sunni populate the central region. Both groups overlap in the area
around Baghdad. Of the 16-20 million Arabs in Iraq, 65-80 percent are Shi'a and
20-30 percent are Sunni. There are 3.6 to 4.8 million Sunni and Shi'a Kurds in the
north, while Turkomans and other groups number aboutl.8 million. These latter
groups are mixed religions, comprised mostly of Sunni and Shi'a but also of some
Christians (Polk 2005, 6). For the break down of this population, see the map and
table below.
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Figure 1. Distribution ofEthnreligious Groups and Major Tribes in Iraq
Source: (http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/middle_east_and_asia/iraq_ethno_2003 .jpg)
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These ethnic and religious divides have existed in the Mesopotamian region
prior to the British creation of the state of Iraq in 1920. The history section will
provide more detail on these divides, but it should be noted that the level of
violence in the country being seen currently has never before existed. The
American led invasion of Iraq in spring 2003 escalated the divides and tensions
that are now being experienced. The US invasion appears to be the immediate
cause of the tensions in Iraq. While Saddam Hussein (a Sunni) attacked the Shi'a
and Kurdish populations during his reign, this was state sponsored attacks and not
the individual militia type attacks being seen now. What this leads me to conclude
is that the tensions in Iraq were created artificially, and this gives some credence
that the same tensions can be helped through formal institutions at the state level
and informal institutions at the local level of governance.
The final dividing line is oil, which creates an economic divide. Several
analysts have pointed out, agriculture in Iraq is sparse, and the country is just able
to feed itself. Its farming is dependent on the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers which
means that only about 33,000 square kilometers of the country can be farmed
(Polk 2005, 9).
Despite the poor topsoil of Iraq, beneath this surface lie vast oil fields. Oil
was discovered in Kirkuk (in the Kurdish north) in 1927. Since then other oil fields
have been discovered, largely in the south.
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Figure 2. Iraq Oil Infrastructure
Source (http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/middle east and asia/irag oil 2003.jpg)

Now that understandings of the problems facing Iraq have been explained,
I will turn to the methods and structure of the paper. Since this paper is seeking to
answer a question about a specific country, I will employ a case study approach
and study Iraqi politics and conflict in more depth. A literature review on divided
societies is included in this thesis, which focuses on elements that have been used
to manage conflict in other divided societies. The final section focuses on a
discussion of the current Iraqi government institutions, others suggestions for a
solution to Iraq and my final assessments of the current Iraqi governmental
institutions.

8
In the first chapter I will look at an institutional and social history of Iraq
since the collapse of the Ottoman Empire and the establishment of British Rule in

1920. I will attempt to review this history in terms of autocracratic and democratic
aspects. By doing this, I hope to provide a context in which to frame the current
situation. By exan1ining the institutions that were rebuilt and replaced in these 87
years, one will better be able to understand the current political situation, as well
as understand how the ethnic divides have been shaped and reinforced.
In the second chapter, I will examine some of the literature that deals with
divided societies and institutions. This will help to determine which political
institutions matter in political stability, and what kind of rights matter. Based on
the literature review, I will develop a set of criteria that are important to manage
conflict in divided societies and promote a stable democracy. With this framework
I will be able to make assessments of the current Iraqi political institutions.
This leads to the third chapter, which will be an assessment of the current
Iraqi governmental institution, and recommendations. The structure of this section
will be to examine the dominant governing styles (presidential vs. parliamentary),
electoral systems (first past the post, proportional representation, etc), and
federalism and autonomy versus unitary structures. In exan1ining these points, I
will first look at the current Iraqi situation using the TAL (Law of Administration
for the State oflraq for the Transitional Period) and the Iraqi Constitution. I will
also review other authors' suggestions. Finally I will put forward my own
recommendations. I would hope that from this I can reach a conclusion about the
direction in which Iraq's developing democracy is headed.
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Many may ask: In a divided society such as Iraq, what incentives do the
people have to work together and build a democracy? There are two dominant
incentives that I assume could form the basis for the Iraqi people to work together
to maintain a democracy. The first incentive is the removal of American and
British invasion forces. This is assumed to be an incentive based on the level of
violence projected at these groups5. Creating a secure country both internally and
externally is the second assumed incentive based on reports from Iraq since March
2003. Since the US led invasion, internal violence among the groups has increased.
An example of this amplified internal violence can be seen by the Sunni
"Awakening Movements", which were created by the US to ensure some security
within Sunni regions surrounding Baghdad. Since there was no unified security
force in Iraq, similar militia groups have arisen throughout Iraq that is carrying out
attacks against one another. This has in effect created a chaotic internal situation in
Iraq and thusly threatens the internal security of the country (ABC News,
12/23/07, 'Sunni Awakening': Insurgents Are Now Allies'). External security is
also assumed to be an incentive for the people of Iraq to build and maintain a
stable democracy to ward off attacks from neighboring countries such as Turkey,
Syria and Iran. Iraq historian William Polk argues on University of Michigan
history professor Juan Cole's webpage that iflraq is allowed to break up into three
states "Turkey would extend its military incursions into Kurdistan, causing a major
war", and Iran would increase its influence in the south, where they would no

5

http://www3.brookings.edu/fp/saban/irag/index.pdf page 8, chart "Enemy Initiated Attacks against
the Coalition and its Partners"
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doubt attempt to influence the fellow Shi'a in the region6 . What would essentially
happen is that the people and culture of Iraq would be absorbed into the
surrounding countries. The framework I discuss in Chapter 2 of this paper may be
able to achieve both of these goals, but it should be noted that there are many other
reasons that the Iraqi people would wish to work together to create a stable
democracy.
The goal of this paper is to not only create a democratic model that will last
but one that can bring stability to the country. If a democracy emerges it is
expected that it will take at least one generation to become fully functional.

6

http://www.juancole.com/2007 06 01 juanricole archive.html "Guest Essay: Polk on Iraq",
6/10/2007
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CHAPTER II
AN INSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF IRAQ: FROM THE OTTOMAN
EMPIRE TO THE PRESENT
Iraq's history is one that has been plagued with revolution, rebellion,
patronage and strong armed dictatorship. Since its inception as a state, the people
of Iraq have faced inequality or oppression at the hands ·of their various leaders,
whether they are colonial powers, kings, or dictators. This pattern of oppression
and authoritarian rule must not be allowed to continue.

The Mesopotamian Provinces
The modern history oflraq (and its modern institutions) begins in 1920 with
the British Mandate. At this point the country was not only formed into one state
from three different provinces, but also institutions of authority (such as
parliaments, a standing army, and constitutions) were constructed to maintain the
state of Iraq. However, these institutions have their roots in the Ottoman Empire.
Iraq was known simply as the "Mesopotamian Provinces" during the time of
the Ottoman Empire. Three provinces existed in this period: Baghdad, Basra, and
Mosul. Mamluk Pashas7 ruled from Baghdad through a tributary system. In the
time of their rule from 174 7-1831, the Mamluk Pashas managed to gain autonomy
from the Ottoman Empire, and brought some degree of economic prosperity and
order to the Mesopotamian region (Tripp 2002, 9).

7

Mamluk Pashas were mostly Christian slaves who were taken by the Ottoman Sultan from Georgia,
conve1ted to Islam and trained as Calvary soldiers. They were under control of the Sultan and used to
enforce his rule abroad. (Hourani 1991, 136)
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Even at this early point in the Ottoman Empire's history (the late sixteenth
early seventeenth century) the three Mesopotamian provinces were divided
amongst the Sunni, Shi'a and Kurdish social lines mentioned in the beginning
section. Dynastic, parochial and tribal identities shaped the Kurdish speaking areas
of Mosul. The province itself was divided among nomadic tribal groups, while the
city of Mosul was more directly integrated into the Ottoman imperial system.
Baghdad was similar, but due to the fact that it was farther away from Turkey, it
was more remote. The Baghdad province was only partially under the authority
disseminated from the Turkish capitol in Istanbul. While the cities were more
influenced by Istanbul, the outlying provinces were agricultural, and the nomadic
nature of the tribes shaped their practices and values (Tripp 2002, 10-11).
From the late seventeenth century until the Ottoman "reconquest" in the
mid-nineteenth century, the Mamluk Pashas continued to grow more distant and
independent of the Ottoman Sultan. As more power was centralized in Baghdad, a
growing distrust of the government arose amongst the Shi'a tribesmen. The
tribesmen already disliked the sultan and were further suspicious of the
centralization of power that was occurring. It was ideas like these that made many
Arabs in the region adopt Shi'ism and begin to shift the balance oflslam in the
Baghdad Province8. The Pashas chose two routes in response to this growing
problem: either by embracing Shi'a Islam, or (due to prejudices, threats of Persian
invasion, and to appeal more to Istanbul) converted to Sunni Islam. The result of
these moves helped to create deep rifts within the region. Further, because the
Note:lraq has always been predominatly Shi'a since the original split in Islam. This is due in part to
the fact that most of the 12 Imams (Shi'a Caliph) are buried in Iraq, making it the theological center for
Shi'a Islam.
8
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ruling elite were converting to Sunni Islam, this also meant that power was in the
hands of the Sunni (Tripp 2002, 12-13).
Now might be a good time to discuss the Shi'a/Sunni division, as it would
not only be a driving force of conflict throughout Iraq's history, but it also is the
reason for the ethnic violence that the country is experiencing today. Of the Arab
countries in the Middle East, only Iraq has a majority Shi'a population (a trait
shared by its neighbor to the east, the Persian country oflran).
The split in Islam between the Shi'a and Sunni Muslims occurred in the
wake of the Prophet Muhammad's death. At the time ofMuhanunad's death, there
were two competing thoughts in Islam as to who would be his successor. The first
line of thought held that the leadership lay vested in the Meccans. This view was
forwarded by Abu Bakr and 'Umar ibn al-Khattab, two companions of
Muhammad, who argued that because Muhammad had lived in Mecca leadership
oflslam should be based there. However the Prophet's immediate family, the Ahl
al-Bayt ("people of the household") was not part of this agreement. Sunni history
of the time excludes this group as a 'coherent and concrete socio-religious entity
during the Prophet's time'. Shi'a history however is founded on the notion that the
Prophet's successor should come from his family and not from his followers. Shi'a
history holds that the Prophet's family "occupied a privileged leadership position
in the socio-religious life of the community and that 'Ali was the only legitimate
claimant to the leadership of the community" (Esack 2005, 54-55). This dispute is
what eventually led to the split in Islam between the Shi'a and Sunni sects. The
Sunni would choose Abu Bakr as the successor to Muhammad, while the Shi'a
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would select Ali, Muhammad's cousin and son-in-law. For the Sunni, the caliph is
Muhammad's successor, while the imam is the descendents of Muhammad, the
successors to Ali, and the leaders of the Shi'a (Hourani 1991, 60-62). The violence
in the region began shortly after this split when in 656, Ali's supporters killed the
third caliph and the Sunni responded by killing Ali's son Husain. In time the Sunni
became victorious, and thus the largest group in Islam, ·and revered the caliph for
its strength and piety, while the Shi'a focused on developing their religious beliefs
through their imams (Hourani 1991, 24-25).
By the mid nineteenth century, the Ottoman Empire began to realize that it
was losing control of the Mesopotamian provinces and set about reasserting its
authority over them. They had become convinced that their weakening control of
the state was the result of its structure and began to rebuild it in a European
centralized model. In order to stave off this decline, the Empire began a process of
reconquering its provinces. This would include reforming administrative,
legislative, and educational and resource bases of the state so that they would
better serve the rapidly declining empire. This reversal in practice would bring
about lasting institutional changes to Iraq, as it would transform the region from a
tribal society to that of a settled agricultural one. To the Ottoman rulers, the belief
was that farmers were easier to control than Bedouins, but for the three provinces
it meant that they were being brought together in a forceful manner under a
centralizing power (Polk 2005, 61; Tripp 2002, 14-15).The result was a strong
resentment in the Mesopotamian provinces which resulted in revolts that were
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crushed by the Ottomans. These revolts weakened the relationship between the
provincial capitol of Baghdad and the outlying tribal lands (Tripp 2002, 19).
As the transformation from a tribal society into a state continued, a new
political society emerged in the three provinces. Governor Midhat Pashat
implemented a land law from 1858 and Vilyat Law of 1864 in 1869. The Vilyat
Law effectively created the territorial boundaries of the three provinces and
established a new administrative structure that was intended to bring governance
down to the village level. The intended result was to allow people from the
government to have some administrative duties. People would become involved in
the working of the state through councils which included Ottomans as well as
Muslim and non-Muslim representatives of the population (Tripp 2002, 15).
The land law that was introduced also seemed to bring about a sense of
autonomy to the Mesopotamian provinces. Among the provisions of this law was
the granting of title deeds to those possessed or occupied land. While the land
remained the property of the state, the owner of it would enjoy complete rights of
ownership to cultivate the tract of land (Tripp 2002, 16).
Despite what looked like positive movements towards self-governance,
Governor Pasha's reforms had a more sinister motive. People with better skills and
connections were able to increase their holding and control over formerly
independent tribesman. Since the Sunni had remained in the cities, they were the
group that benefited most from the system of favoritism, better known as
patronage which Midhat Pasha created to carry out these reforms (Polk 2005, 6162). The system of patronage that developed at this time in Iraq would have long
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standing effects on the Shi'a tribes because patronage ensured that the same
groups or tribes retained positions of power and employment in the areas of
military, economic and political spheres. The reforms were intended to facilitate
investment and tax collection. Growth of export trade had led city merchants and
tribal leaders to invest in land reclamation, canal digging, and dam building, all
helping to build the provinces infrastructure.
When Sultan Abdulhamid suspended the constitution and ended the
liberalizing reforms mentioned above, a revolt by the Young Turks in 1908 and
forced the Sultan to reintroduce the constitution. The reintroduction of the
constitution allowed people who had been suppressed under the authoritarian
movements of the Sultan to move into institutions of modern learning, and training
in the military and professional fields was reopened. This allowed for the
formation of clubs, groups and societies, newspapers, and journals entering the
public sphere in the provinces (Tripp 2002, 21-23). This liberalization of politics
emerged the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) which eventually became
the dominant party in the Ottoman Parliament.
The reintroduction of the Ottoman constitution brought about a new hope for
the decentralization of power from Istanbul to provinces. However, the CUP
moved in just the opposite direction and began to centralize power in the
government during 1913/1914. The increasing authoritarian nature of the CUP saw
the party entrench itself in the Arab provinces and simultaneously reject the calls
for autonomy in the region (Tripp 2002, 24). Due to the increasing centralization,
many Arabs in the Mesopotamian provinces feared they would eventually lose
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their cultural identity and as a result protests began to emphasize the importance of
Arab culture and identity (Tripp 2002, 27).
Opposition to the CUP resulted in the growth of secret societies, the most
significant of which was al-'Ahd (the Covenant), After its founding in Istanbul, al
'Ahd spread throughout the Arab provinces with the hope of establishing three
independent provinces in the Mesopotamian region. Ottoman authorities arrested
its members in 1914, and al-'Ahd was ended. Its idea of three independent
provinces was further crushed when the British invaded the province of Basra in
1914 (Tripp 2002, 27-29).
Prior to the invasion, British merchants (with support from the government)
had been in Iraq since the end of the sixteenth century. Needing a faster route to
their empire in India, the British discovered that the Euphrates linked their empire
in the West with that in the East. Beginning in 1764, the British established
consulates in Basra and Baghdad in 1798. Challenges from the French, Russians
and Germans were thwarted through plague (French) war between the Russians
and the Ottomans and politics. The British pressured Kuwait to forbid trading with
Germany, thus preventing the Germans from having access to the Middle East.
These incidences helped keep British businesses in Mesopotamia secure (Polk
2005, 62-65).
When the British army invaded Basra in 1914 they easily defeated the
Ottomans through the strong influence of the merchants and thus made their
presence overt. Charles Tripp states "the history of Iraq begins here, not simply as
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the history of the states formal institutions, but as histories of all those who found
themselves drawn into the new regime of power" (Tripp 2002, 30).
By the end of 1918, the British had conquered the three provinces of
Mesopotamia, but at a large price. The invasion to secure British interests in the
region had cost 750 million pounds (today-$18 billion) and some 20,000 Indian
troops, only to result in a state that had an uncertain future. At the end of hostilities
in Europe, the future of the provinces was unclear, but one thing had emerged
from the British presence in Mesopotamia. In a situation that is echoed today, the
people of Basra, Baghdad and Mosul provinces were glad to see their Ottoman
rulers dismissed, but they were equally apprehensive about the British occupation
force (Polk 2005, 71-72).

The British in Iraq (1920-1932)
The British gained control of the Mesopotamian Region through the 1916
Sykes-Picot Agreement that divided the former Ottoman Empire between the
French and the British. The document accepted Arab independence, but in
accordance with sharif(a religious leader who is a descendent of the Prophet
Muhanunad) Husain, a member of the I-Iashemite clan. 9
The Sykes-Picot Agreement established areas of permanent influence and
began the period which is referred to as the "British Mandate". Following a tribal
revolt in 1920 against British military occupation, an attempt was made to
establish institutions of self-government under British control. The result was that
The Hashemite's were the clan to which Muhammad was born. Originally from Saudi Arabia, the
Hashemite that were to eventually rule Iraq were of the Sunni Muslim faith (Hourani 1991, 318; Esack
2005, 36; Nydell 2006, 168).
9
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the Hashcmite Amir Faisal (who had been expelled from Syria by the French) was
placed as king oflraq under British supervision (Hourani 1991, 319). The
placement of a Sunni in control of a predominantly Shi'a country is perhaps where
the origins of the ethnic violence in Iraq today can be traced. Until 2003, the Sunni
would hold power in the country. The reasoning behind the British decision to
place Faisal in control of the new state comes from his exile from Syria, at which
point the British protected him and established a close relation with Faisal. Thus,
like the US when they placed Ahmed Chalabi (a man who had not been in Iraq
since a teenager and was out of touch with the country) in power, Faisal too was
out of touch with Iraq and detested by the population (Tripp 2002, 47).
As previously mentioned tribal Muslim's converted to the Shi'a faith due to
disagreements with the Ottoman Empire over centralization. When the British
Mandate took effect in 1920, many Shi'a were still tribal people. The First
Commissioner of Iraq, Perry Cox, found it easier to work with the more urbanized
Sunni Muslim's when he established the provisional "Council of the State". Nearly
all high officials in the newly formed British state, all positions of military
command, and the kingship were populated with Sunni. Cox rejected an offer from
Shi'a clergymen that would have negotiated the tribal unrest that the British were
encountering, and instead chose a move that effectively shut the Shi'a out of
power in the new state, a move that would remain in place until 2003 (Tripp 2002,
45-48; Polk 2005, 78-79).
The state that the British were creating had been referred to as al-Iraq since
at least the eighth century by Arab geographers, meaning 'the shore of a great river
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along its length, as well as the grazing land surrounding it' (Tripp 2002, 8). The
Arab geographers had used it to refer to the area between the Tigris and Euphrates
Rivers. To the Europeans it was known as Mesopotamia and to the Ottomans,
simply by the three provinces Basra, Baghdad and Mosul. During the era of the
British Mandate the three provinces were incorporated into one state and the term
"Iraq" began to be reintroduced as both a country and a term to describe the
people's that inhabited that area (Tripp 2002, 8, 30).
When King Faisal took control of the new Iraqi state in 1921 only the
vilayet's (regions) of Baghdad and Basra were part of the state. The third region,
Mosul, was added in 1926 and completed the modem territorial boundaries oflraq.
Faisal would remain in power under British authority until his death in 1933.
During his tenure, the Iraqi state would take on greater definition, and the structure
of Iraq's politics would emerge. Faisal had an idea of what the state oflraq should
be and set about achieving independence from the British and integrating the
communities of Iraq into one unitary structure that would allow the individual
regions to feel that their interests were represented (Tripp 2002, 50).
During this period, the relationship with Britain was continuously debated.
On the one hand, officials in Iraq realized they needed the British support, yet
rejected its domination on the other hand. This oxymoron created a network of
clients and associates whose relationships with the political player's dictated
policy. Tribal shaikh's, Kurdish chieftains, and other notables from Iraqi cities and
provinces congregated to Baghdad to ensure that their interests were represented,
thusly turning Iraq into a reward state based on a patronage system. Continuing the
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process begun by Midhat Pasha, the patronage system helped the British ensure
order in the countryside, while at the same time creating a network of political and
land interests. The patronage system established during the mandate became a part
oflraqi politics to this day (Tripp 2002, 50-51 ).
The British were aware of the opposition to their rule and to Faisal's wish
for autonomy, and so they set about establishing a relationship with Iraq, via the
first Anglo-Iraqi treaty in 1922 that made it appear as though the two states were
equals. However, the treaty created an anything but equal position between the
states. Instead it established a twenty-year agreement during which the King of
Iraq would heed British advice on all matters that affected British interests, and
that British officials would be appointed into eighteen posts of their choice to act
as advisors and inspectors. The final provision of the treaty shifted a financial
burden on Iraq, requiring it to pay half of the costs of the British officials, among
other expenses. In agreeing to the terms, the council of ministers insisted that the
treaty by ratified by the Constituent Assembly once it came into being following
the May 1922 elections. The results of this agreement created a strong outcry as
controversy surrounded the constitutional framework of the state as well as making
Iraq politically and economically dependent on Britain 10
The Electoral Law of 1922 and the constitution the British created decided
the formal allocation of power in the state. Both documents would further the
patronage system that was developing in Iraq by making it so that some could rely
on the social structure to move ahead in the political system, while others would
0
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rely on the state structure. It was in this context that the 1922 elections took place.
The Constituent Assembly that met for the first time in 1924 was composed of
many British supporters. It reluctantly accepted the treaty, after the British
promised they would fulfill the terms of the mandate in other ways if necessary.
The adopted Iraqi constitution (known as the "Organic Law") was also passed by
this assembly and established Iraq as sovereignty with a representative system of
government and a hereditary constitutional monarchy. The constitution further
granted the monarchy wide ranging powers that allowed it the right to call for
elections, confirm all laws, regardless of parliament, suspend parliament, and to
fulfill the treaty without permission of the parliament. The British had managed to
create an indirect control on Iraq and remove themselves from directly ruling it. 11
The constitution granted Iraq no political freedom. The parliament was to be
composed of hand picked members, chosen by an indirect ballot, but still allow the
country to be a "representative system". Further the mandate divided the country
into 14 governates that were overseen by locals who supported the King and the
British advisors (Polk 2005, 88-89).
The passage of the Constitution not only established the formal machinery of
the state but also allowed Britain to achieve two of its goals. First it allowed for
British troops to be pulled out oflraq, which had become a costly and unpopular
campaign The Iraq campaign cost a young Winston Churchill and his Labour Party
control of the parliament). Secondly it made Britain an advisor to the Iraqi state,
without having direct control of it. This latter move allowed Britain to still fulfill
the mandate requirements and also retain control of the cow1try (Dodge 2003, 30).
II
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Growing opposition to the Mandate within Iraq led Britain to push for Iraq's
entry into the League of Nations in 1932. Iraq was accepted into the League later
in the year, and Britain's mandate came to an end. This period, while costly to
Britain, also established many practices and institutions, such as the establishment
of a permanent patronage system that would remain in place for the remainder of
Iraq's history. Territorial boundaries had been laid, while a system of patronage
had been adopted and would continue to grow in Iraq for the forthcoming decades.
Clearly the years 1920-32 would have a lasting impact on Iraq.
Despite ending the mandate, British presence would still be felt until 1958.
A new Anglo-Iraqi treaty was signed in 1930 that formed the basis for Britain's
relationship with Iraq after 1932. The treaty placed responsibility for internal order
on the King and made Iraq responsible for its own defense. At the same time it
also provided Great Britain the use of all facilities in event of war and the right to
move British troops through Iraq if necessary. Further, Iraq's army would still
have British advisors and equipment, and the British would keep two airbases in
Iraq. The provisions could be renegotiated after twenty years. In other areas the
British would maintain advisors and British companies would remain in all
sections of the economy, while British influence on the King and his ministers
would remain (Tripp 2002 66, 77). When a revolution in 1941 was attempted, it
would be against these practices that the rebels would revolt against.
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The Hashemite Monarchy (1932-1958)
During the period of 1932-41, the patronage system became more
entrenched in Iraq politics. Competition between the client networks for control of
the center was turning Iraq into a secular state where the questions of economic
privilege, redistribution of wealth and the idea of fundamental rights governed the
politics. The patronage system was allowing state institutions to become personal
instruments of power in the hands of individuals, creating factionalism among the
people (Tripp 2002, 77-78).
Sunni domination continued to grow in Iraq following the 1933 Parliament
elections, in which the leader of the Shi'a party Ikha ("Awakening") was alienated
from the Parliament, helping to reinforce the Sunni dominated state. King Faisal
recognized the growing isolation of Iraq's non-Sunni members but he did not wish
to overturn the situation because it privileged both him and his supporters. When
Faisal died in 1933, his son Ghazi took over as king and proved to be less
sympathetic to the disparities in Iraq. During his time as a leader (which lasted
until 1939) the Sunni were able to portray the Shi'a as traitors to a modern Iraq
after a 1935 rebellion by Shi'a tribesmen, clerics, and Shaikh's. The rebellion was
oppressed and the Sunni leadership dispersed the Shi'a tribesman, thus nullifying
them as a threat (Tripp 2002, 80-84).
Little has been said about Kurdistan, which since 1925 had been
incorporated into the Iraqi state. Originally the British led the Kurdish population
in Mosul believe that they would have independence, but the discovery of oil in
the region led to the British annexing the region and adding it to the Iraqi state in
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1925. Despite this forging of the Mosul province into the Iraqi state, the region
was not politically, administratively, or culturally integrated into Iraq. Following
the end of the mandate, Britain allowed the Kurds to come under control of the
Arab government in Baghdad. The belief was that as Sunni, the Kurds would
sympathize with the Sunni minority in the south, and allow the Sunni to claim
dominance in the Iraqi state. Instead, the Kurdish leaders took the opportunity of
revolutions in the 1930s to try and advance their demands for cultural,
administrative and territorial autonomy. Due to Iraq's instability in this period, the
Hashemite monarchy was not able to assimilate the Kurds into Iraq. However, it
proved to the Kurds that they would be fighting the Arabs in the south for their
demands later (O'Leary, Salih 2005, 21-24).
This instability in Iraq was due to a lack of direction in the state and ethnic
violence. The executives had no support from any parties in the parliament, while
no decision could be made about either a pro-or-anti British policy. Likewise, no
decision could be agreed upon as to whether Iraq should be Pro-Iraqi or Pro-Arab
in its foreign policy stance. Rather the only ideas that could be formed were based
on personal interests of those in power (O'Leary, Salih 2005, 20).
The first Hashemite monarchy came to an end in 1941 with a coup led by
Prime Minister Rashid Ali. After attacking the British airbase near Baghdad, the
British retaliated and Ali turned to the only ally who would help: Germany.
Despite some help from the Germans, the British were able to defeat the Iraqi's
with a small disjointed army of troops from their surrounding colonies. Rashid Ali
was defeated and the young regent king and the Ambassador to Iraq, Nuri al-Said,
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were returned to Iraq and order restored (Polk 2005, 95-96). The result of the coup
meant that political activity in Iraq ended for sometime and an attempt to change
the rules was thwarted.
The period 1941-1958 was noted for strong handed authoritarianism,
especially from the likes ofNuri al-Said, who would either rule outwardly as
Prime Minister, or from the wings in some other capacity. Al-Said's political
views certainly shaped this period and he held a belief that politics existed on two
levels: one that was dominated by alliances, co-ops and destruction or
neutralization of the opposition, while the other view held that success was
dependent on these factors in order to explain the region and Iraqi history (Tripp
2002, 108).
Under al-Said's direction the patronage system already in place was
increased in scope. He would make sure that the major beneficiaries of public
expenditures were the powerful families at the core of Iraqi influence. Nuri further
believed this strategy could only work if the security forces were loyal. The result
was a pyran1id of patronage that would uphold and support the monarchy until
1958 (Tripp 2002, 110).
Following the restoration of the monarchy in 1941, the King would have less
power and much of the state administration would fall to the new Prime Minister,
Nuri al-Said. Under al-Said's direction a series of purges occurred to rid the
country of the revolutionary forces and politicians. These purges allowed for many
new positions to open in the government, and the patronage system made it
permissible for these positions to be filled. After order was brought to Iraq, al-Said
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resigned in 1944, and Tariq al-Suwaidi became the new prime minister. Under his
direction detention camps were ended, censorship laws were lifted, and most
importantly a new electoral law was introduced. This electoral law retained the
two-stage elections established by previous laws, but also divided Iraq into 100
electoral areas. This latter move allowed for more representation in the outlying
areas oflraq (Tripp 2002, 112-114).
The moves instigated by al-Suwaidi led to a liberalization of politics unseen
before in Iraq. Many new parties arose, including those that opposed the British
openly, those that supported Arab nationalism, and those that supported socialist
dogma, among other interests. However, this liberalization was short lived when
al-Suwaidi resigned in the face of opposition in 1946 and al-Said was reinstated as
Prime Minister by the regent king. Al-Said realized that the same opposition to
Britain that had existed since 1920 still existed and urged the regent king to sign a
treaty with Britain that would paint British-Iraqi relations more favorably, and
lessen British appearance in Iraq. This treaty created political upheaval when it
was realized that relations with Britain had not changed, but been merely altered.
The British would continue to be supervisors in the region, and still control most
economic policies. Following the upheaval another round of arrests, tortures and
imprisonment or exile of legislators occurred (Polk 2005, 98). What looked like a
possible end to the monarchy and British rule was quickly put down and strong
armed order was restored.
With the emergence of the United States and the Soviet Union as the two
dominant superpowers in the world, foreign policy suddenly became dominant in
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the Middle East, as these two powers would vie for control of this region, as in
other areas of the world. Iraq became a political battleground against this
backdrop. Driven by a hatred of the newly created state oflsrael, and of General
Nasser's strong Arab-Nationalism coming out of Egypt, Iraq would become even
less stable as the decade of the 1950's continued.
It was during the early 1950's that oil became a major commodity in the
world market. Al-Said set about restructuring Iraq's economy around oil (shifting
from agriculture) while politically establishing a one-party state. The single party
(the Constitutional Union Party [CUP]) he created would be the only legitimate
political organization in Iraq and all politicians who wished to enter the parliament
were required to join it. Economically, al-Said set about gaining greater revenue
for Iraq's oil from the British dominated Iraq Petroleum Company (IPC). As
demand for oil increased following the war, the IPC's revenue increased. Nuri
persuaded the IPC to give more of the revenue to Iraq, which eventually resulted in
a 50-50 split of the income. Additionally it was agreed that Iraq could receive 12.5
percent of its production of oil to sell on the world market. This would allow for
the profits of the oil to develop Iraq's infrastructure. Dams, highways, and bridges
were constructed with this new income. Revamping the agricultural sector was less
successful. Rather than fixing the structural problems of the current lands, new
lands were brought into being and agricultural production fell. Less productive
lands were left to poor farmers, while the land suitable for production was owned
by wealthy individuals who merely used it to increase their control on the state.
The Development Board (which contained American and British technical experts,
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and received plans for infrastructure development from American and British
firms) was met with opposition. The failure to develop the agricultural sector in
Iraq created dissent in the farming community and the beginnings of the 1958
revolution were planted (Tripp 2002, 128; Polk 2005, 100).
As he had done in 1944, al-Said wished to rule Iraq from the sides and
stepped down as its Prime Minister in 1952. Al-Said could easily still rule due to
his control of the state networks. When Mustafa al-'Umari became PM (with al
Said's approval) he set about making electoral reforms. However it was clear from
the outset that free and fair elections would not occur, and instead electoral reform
became the rallying cry of the opposition. Martial law was again declared when
violent uprising occurred in the wake of the 1952 elections. While a planned
revolution had been curbed, it was clear that opposition was growing to the Iraqi
state structure, the monarchy, and Nuri al-Said's authoritarianism (Tripp 2002,
130-131).
May 1954 saw Iraq's freest elections to date, when the National Front
(composed of the Peace Partisans, National Democratic Party, and the Istiqlal
Party) won areas in urban Iraq. However, with al-Said's CUP still dominant in the
Parliament, the National Front's victories were meaningless. Nuri al-Said
dissolved parliament disbanded his own party and attacked the opposition, thereby
making himself the ruler of Iraq. All this, in the name of "the good of the state"
would remain in place until 1958 (Tripp 2002, 137).
If domestic policies were creating dissent in Iraq during the mid-1950's, al
Said's foreign policy decision to join Turkey, Great Britain, the United States,
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Pakistan and Iran in the Baghdad Pact in 1955 would solidify opposition to the
Iraqi government. Having no interest in Nasser's pro-Arabism, al-Said was driven
by an Iraqi Nationalist perspective, and this is what drove his foreign policy
decisions. The formation of the Baghdad Pact by the aforementioned nations
created a common defense for the region and an economic pact which stated that
Britain and the United States would pledge assistance to Iraq if Iraq was attacked
(Hourani 1991, 363). In the following years, this agreement would be the basis for
Western Support of Saddam Hussein.
The Baghdad Pact ended up dividing the region following Nasser attacking
it and stirring up Arab Nationalism in Iraq. Iraq had still been perceived by many
Arab nationalists as a British satellite, and the formation of the pact only
underscored this opinion. Now that the US was involved as well, anti-Western,
Pro-Arab nationalism was growing in Iraq (Louis and Owen 2002, 17-18).
In 1956, Nasser defeated the British at the Suez Canal and further
heightened Arab nationalism. The US feared Iraq would be the next country to fall,
and passed the Eisenhower Doctrine to funnel aid to Iraq that year. However, it
was not enough to end revolutionary uprisings, as two years later the monarchy,
the British influence, and the Western influence in Iraq would end.
The revolution of 1958 forever changed Iraq's political landscape. The
revolution was driven by powerful internal, social, and political forces, and
external pressure by British and American officials in Iraq claiming that the USSR
and Egypt were responsible for the strife proved to be untrue. Rather, it was later
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proven that Iraqi nationalist sentiment which had been brewing for sometime was
responsible for the change.

The Iraqi Republic (1958-1968)
After the coup, General Abd al-Karim Qasim appointed himself Prime
Minister. Supported by the Iraqi Communist Party (ICP) Qasim set about making
sure other parties could not gain power in the state by appealing to the various
factions that arose in the wake of the coup that everyone must work together for a
common good of establishing a real Iraqi state. Qasim was initially successful at
this by furthering Iraqi society through such measures as increasing women's
rights, Iraqi youth rights, and trade union and peasant rights. He also initiated a
land reform that redistributed the land to the peasants and small landowners.
However, as was the case in prior land reform attempts, landless peasants received
very little (Tripp 2002, 154-53).
Despite his promises of greater openness in Iraq, Qasim became increasingly
dictatorial in power. Qasim did nothing to create representative institutions or hold
parliamentary elections. It was finally after failed foreign policy initiatives
(including trying to nationalize the ICP and lying claim to Kuwait) that Qasim was
overthrown in 1963. It was at this point that a once little known and little
supported party known as the Ba'ath party took power (Tripp 2002, 160-67).
The Ba'ath (renaissance) had emerged in the wake of the 1958 revolution
but was suppressed by Qasim's regime. It drew support from the young
generations of Shi'a and Sunni Arab nationalists. Despite appealing for a single
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Arab nation, the Ba'ath party had become more socialist in its rhetoric since 1958,
leading to its mass appeal. Using this appeal, the Ba'athists made their first attempt
at gaining power. After initially purging their rivals, they lost the support of the
army and appeared to no longer be contenders for power in Iraq. After their
removal, the resulting government over the next decade was headed by two
brothers, first Abd al-Salaam Arif (until his death in 1966) and then Abd ar
Rahman Arif until 1968. The brothers Arif reversed the partial openness and lower
class reform Qasim had attempted to create. Instead they reestablished the
patronage system, kinship and tribal affiliation to court power and dismantled what
was left of the Ba'ath party at the time (Hourani 1991, 404-405; Tripp 2002, 177).
The Arif brothers' tenure as rulers oflraq came to an end in 1967 in the face
of yet another defeat against Israel. The defeat sparked demonstrations in Iraq and
leading these demonstrations was the recently recreated Ba'ath party (Abd al
Salaam Arif had dismantled the party again after an attempted coup in 1964). The
first thing the Ba'athists realized they had to do was to neutralize Abd ar Rahman
Arif's elite Republican Guard. They did this by appealing to a number of its
members who felt disillusioned by the system of patronage. It was when Arif went
abroad in 1968 that the Ba'athists seized power in a bloodless coup which resulted
in Arif's resignation (Polk 2005, 117; Tripp 2002, 191).

The Ba 'ath Party and Saddam Hussein (1969-2003)
The result of this coup was yet another installation of the same type of
regime with another name. The Ba'athists was led by former military personal
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under the direction of General Hassan al-Bakr. Al-Bakr centralized all offices of
leadership: president, prime minister, secretary general of the Ba'ath party and
chairman of the "Revolutionary Command Council". Further al-Bakr designed the
political order to include extended families, clans and tribal networks from the
Sunni Arab region that would (if disproportional) influence the state politics. This
system of patronage would allow Saddam Hussein to take control of Iraq in 1979
(Tripp 2002, 193).
Al-Bakr continued to centralize all state activity so as to support himself and
his associates in power. As his close associate, Saddam Hussein was able to further
his own power at this time by gaining control of the security apparatus of Iraq in
the mid-l 970s and being appointed a general in 1976. The following year Hussein
took control oflraq's oil policy and in 1979 took over for al-Bakr when he
resigned.
Saddam Hussein had already proven himself a worthy administrator. During
the 1960s, relations with Iran had soured and under Saddam's direction the Shi'a
were targeted because of their relations with Iran, a trend that would continue
through his rule. More threatening to Hussein however where the Kurds to the
north. Hussein realized early that he could not defeat them in a military battle and
instead he ordered a massive migration of Arabs into the Kurdish region offset the
non-Arab population there. When this policy failed, Hussein was willing to grant
the Kurds autonomy in 1975, until it was realized that the Kurdish region held vast
amounts of oil. Kurdistan would remain a part of Iraq until 1991, under constant
attack from Hussein (Salih 2005, 21-22; Polk 2005, 121-22; Tripp 2002, 213-14).
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When he assumed power in 1979, Saddam Hussein established a dictatorial
model that demanded obedience and used large scale violence to obtain it.
However, as we have seen through Iraq's history, the factors that allowed Hussein
to carry out this style government were not alien. Tripp states that "the values he
[Hussein] espouse[d] on the political logic of the system he established in Iraq
have all been prefigured in previous regimes to varying degrees" (194). Over the
next 24 years Hussein would manipulate Iraq history to create a state based on
exclusivity, mistrust, patronage and violence in which a small group held power at
the center.
Saddam's rise was clearly the result of the state apparatus that had been built
over time in Iraq. There was no revolution, no murder, just a simple change of
power. Since 1920 various leaders had established an elaborate and complex
bureaucratic system. The complexity of the system made it difficult for anyone to
oversee the whole system, making that person vulnerable to those at the top.
Saddam Hussein had merely moved through this system since 1964 until he rose to
the top of it.
Hussein created numerous state institutions to help him appear as a
representative of the Iraqi people. In 1980 parliament was reinstated for the first
time since 1958, although as a fa9ade to make it appear that there was some
supervision of the government. Its representatives were appointed by Saddam who
held all of the power. What had been created was yet another patronage system,
although this time much more elaborate and sustained by violence (Tripp 2002,
226).

35
The next major change to Iraqi political institutions would not occur until
after the Iran-Iraq war during the 1980s. In short at the end of the costly war in
which neither side was a winner, Iraq was nearing bankruptcy. After taking out
loans from its neighbors, and from the west (namely the United States), Iraq was
going to attempt to rebuild its shattered infrastructure through the sale of oil.
However the price of oil had declined in the years after the war and Iraq could not
pay its loans back. Its neighbor to the south, Kuwait, began to demand its money
that it had leant Iraq. Saddam, realizing he could not pay asked that the loan be
cancelled, and when Kuwait declined, Saddam demanded Kuwait should help
rebuild Iraq's infrastructure. Kuwait rejected this as well and Hussein made the
threat that Iraq would take what it wanted by force. On August 21, 1990 this is
indeed what Iraq did when they invaded Kuwait (Tripp 2002, 252; Polk 2005, 128140).
Saddam attempted to justify the invasion by laying a historical claim to
Kuwait. Kuwait had been a part oflraq (it was part of the Ottoman province of
Basra) but had been severed when the British created the Iraqi state in the 1920's.
Qasim had earlier attempted to reunite Kuwait with Iraq in 1961. However he did
not use force to try and retake it, and the British placed troops in Kuwait to ensure
that no further threats were made. Until 1990, this was the last action Iraq had
made about claiming Kuwait (Tripp 2002, 166).
After being forced to withdraw from Kuwait in 1991, Saddam brutally put
down a Shi'a uprising. A f-tlfther rebellion in the Kurdish north nearly resulted in
an equally brutal repression. However the UN stepped in and created a 'safe
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haven' north of the 36th Parallel. Under this provision, Iraqi jets and military were
prevented from crossing this line.
This move created a de facto autonomous Kurdish region that would remain
in place until 2003. In May 1991, the Kurds of Iraq held what can arguably be
called the first free and fair elections in the Iraq. They created a national assembly
and achieved a goal that Kurds since 1920 had been attempting: self-government.
Brendan O'Leary and Khalid Salih take two opinions of this however. The first is
that the failure of the two parties in Kurdistan (Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP)
and Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK)) failed to create a unified security force
which resulted in a civil war in the mid 1990s. The other opinion argues that even
with this civil war, life has been better for all in Kurdistan after the partition.
Indeed it is argued that while much work needs to be done in the region, it was the
freest part oflraq in the states history (O'Leary and Salih 2005, 24-29). Sadly this
experiment came to an end when Saddam was overthrown and Iraq was once more
ignorantly unified.
The remaining two thirds of Iraq would fall victim to the weight of crushing
sanctions and an increase in power by Saddam, who relied once more on the
patronage system. In the mid 1990's the Oil for Food program was enacted which
allowed Iraq to export oil in return needed health supplies and food, however these
were restricted based on what the UN determined could make weapons of mass
destruction. Despite his brutality in the 1990s, Saddam Hussein had been severely
weakened after the first Gulf War. The southern portion oflraq was portioned in
the mid 1990s further reducing Hussein's influence over the state. By 2003,

37
Hussein was no threat to anyone in the region and barely a threat to those outside
of the narrow central part of Iraq (Polk 2005, 165).
The institutional history of Iraq ends here. Since 2003 a provisional Iraqi
government has been able to pass a constitution that does not work. The state has
devolved into chaos and no one (either Iraqi's or the US) know what direction the
state will take. However, just by examining the institutional history of Iraq what
we are seeing in Iraq is nothing new. The ethnic violence and upheavals have been
a part of the Iraqi state since its formation. Further the history has shown us a
pattern: out of the chaos and rebellion that has cycled through and through, a
strong armed dictatorship usually emerges. However, as the rest of this paper will
examine perhaps there is a democratic alternative to bringing order to Iraq.
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CHAPTER III
FOSTERING STABLE DEMOCRACY IN DIVIDED SOCIETIES

Nelson Polsby writes that "for a political system to be viable, for it to
succeed in performing tasks ofauthoritative resource allocation, problem solving,
conflict settlement, and so on, in behalfofa population ofany substantial size, it
must be institutionalized" (Polsby 1968, 144). Polsby means that organizations
must be specialized to political activity or else the system will become "weak and
incapable of servicing the demands or protecting the interests ofits constituent
groups" (Polsby 1968, 144). It is also important that the political system be free
and democratic and that representatives be institutionalized to promote diversity.
Political opposition must also be legitimized and contained in the political system
(Polsby 1968, 144).
The considerations Polsby outlines above are the guidelines with which my
framework for a stable democracy in divided society will develop. It will be
important that the framework accounts for diversity among ethnic groups,
maintains political opposition, protects minorities, and is above all democratic in
all aspects. With these criteria in mind, this chapter aims to identify elements that
stabilize democracy in divided societies. By looking at autonomy, power-sharing,
proportionality, a framework will be developed to create for democracy in divided
societies. For the purposes ofthis paper, I use Nordlinger's definition ofregulation
in an intense conflict, which I replace with stability for a divided society. This is
defined as "the absence of widespread violence and governmental repression"
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(Nordlinger 1972, 11). For the purposes of this paper, I argue that the minimalist
elements of democracy as defined by Robert Dahl are necessary but not sufficient
for a divided society. Dahl defines a democracy as "the continuing responsiveness
of the government to the preferences of its citizens, considered as political equals"
and that in order for democracy to continue over a period of time citizens must be
able to formulate their preferences, be allowed to practice individual and collective
action, and have their preferences weighed with no discrimination (Dahl 1971, 12). Political rights, such as elections and rights to form organizations, and civil
rights, such as freedom of speech and the right to vote are listed by Dahl as some
of the basic requirements for a democracy among a large number of people (Dahl
1971, 3). However these elements alone, which may facilitate majoritarian
democracy, are not enough for Iraq. In this chapter I argue that in addition to the
elements outlined by Dahl, divided societies will need supplementary other
institutions.
A brief consideration of the roots of conflict may be necessary before I
discuss how to manage ethnic conflict. For this discussion I turn to Mohamad
Rabie's book Conflict Resolution and Ethnicity (1994). Rabie states that conflict is
based on ideas, values, images, belief systems, sociopolitical structure and societal
processes. Due to this, the aim to end conflict and, for the purposes of this paper,
foster democracy should be to "introduce new ideas, institute new values and build
sociopolitical structures both nationally and internationally to make human and
institutional interaction more cooperative and less competitive and conflictual"
(Rabie, 1994, 21).
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Rabie states the conflict resolution should emphasize a reformation of
"existing relationships through attitudinal, institutional and structural change"
(22). State structure plays a role in either creating or controlling conflict. As Rabie
points out, no government can commit to all of its citizens equally, and thus
conflict is created. The level of conflict is often an outgrowth of a group's
diversity and cultural differences, which tend to be heightened by the failure of the
people in power to "act on the needs of their citizens as they perceive them"
(Rabie 1994, 26). It is important that the state structure accommodate and
understand the ideas, values, and issues of each group and to make sure that each
groups interests are represented in the state institutions.
For Rabic, democracy is the best means to "facilitate political participation
and integrate the opposition into the main political stream" (27). He goes on to
state that democracy can allow for stability and prosperity to prevail, while at the
same time allowing for an effective opposition, political participation, reduction of
tension, control of corruption, accountability and regulation of dissent (28). Rabie
mentions three models that can be used to achieve these goals. The first is the
consociational, or consensus, model advocated by Arend Lijphart (1977). The
second is the undemocratic control model, which places groups in a
minority/majority role (61-63). The final model is Rabie's own 'shared homeland'
model that calls for "political separation along nationality or ethnic lines, while
maintaining or initiating economic and social unity across political lines" (Rabie
1994, 177). Rabie's model is important because it allows national minorities to
form autonomous regions within existing states and still enjoy their freedom. This
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model is different from the consensus model in the respect that the shared
homeland model requires all political entities to share land with other national
groups, as opposed to consensus democracy which separates the ethnic groups into
segments.
Now might be a good moment to distinguish between what is meant between
majoritarian and non-majoritarian democracy, as these terms will be used
frequently in the following sections. The majoritarian model concentrates power
in the hands of the majority and is exclusive, competitive and adversarial. Lijphart
discusses ten dimensions of the executive-parties structures in majoritarian
government. Characteristics of the majoritarian model include a dominance of the
executive branch over the legislative branch, two-party system, majoritarian and
disproportional electoral systems, and pluralist interest groups with competition
among group (Lijphart 1999, 2-3). A unitary state is part of the majoritarian
model. The main feature of the unitary state is that it concentrates the power of the
government at the center. Related to this notion is that legislative power is
concentrated in a unicameral legislature (Lijphart 1999, 2-3). The remaining
characteristics which include rigid constitutions changed by extraordinary
measures, legislatures that have the final word on the constitutionality of their own
legislature, and central banks that are dependent on the executive branch are also
features of a unitary state, but are not important for this paper. Since the goal of
the framework I am developing is to eliminate a single majority, the unitary
majoritarian government is rejected.
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In contrast, the non-majoritarian, or consensus model, seeks to maximize the
size of majorities. Its institutions aim to have broad participation in the
government and broad agreement of government policies. Contrasting with the
above characteristics of majoritarian government, a non-majoritarian government
has broad multiparty coalitions, an executive-legislative balance of power,
multiparty systems, proportional representation, and coordinated interest group
systems that are aimed at compromised and concentration (Lijphart 1999, 2-3).
Many authors including Arend Lijphart, Benjamin Reilly, Eric Nordlinger,
Milton Esman, William Kymlicka, Ted Gurr and Donald Horowitz agree that non
majoritarian clements are needed for democracy to work in divided societies.
These elements are divided between two schools of thought: group rights versus
individual rights. Lijphart's consociational/consensus model is most associated
with group rights because it includes grand coalitions, mutual vetoes,
proportionality and power sharing among the groups. Essentially each of the
elements of consociationalism is an attempt to reduce a single majority.
Horowitz on the other hand rejects group rights on the ground that a high
price is often paid by the groups in conflict as each group will be forced to
concede something. Horowitz argues for individual rights via fostering
cooperation through incentives. The result of an incentive approach is that it will
promote accommodation and moderation among ethnic groups (Horowitz 2002,
25). Also agreeing with Horowitz's moderate approach is Benjamin Reilly. Reilly
argues that candidates must behave moderately and act accommodating in order to
attract support from other groups (Reilly 2001, 10). In order to create this
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moderate behavior, Reilly advocates centripetalism, which unlike
consociationalism promotes bringing parties together at the center through
compromising on issues (Reilly 2001, 11). Since it requires candidates to reach
out to other segments of society, centripetalism promotes cooperation among the
candidates.

Autonomy/Federalism
Autonomy is defined by Milton Esman as "the right [of ethnic groups] to
select officials and control significant areas of public affairs, preferential access by
natives to economic opportunities, and privileged or exclusive status for the ethnic
language in education and government transactions" (Esman 1994, 7). This
definition explains why autonomy is important for a group. It allows a group to
maintain control over itself and make its own decisions on matters that concern the
group (Lijphart 1977, 41). As Kymlicka notes, autonomy and federalism will
allow groups to develop their cultures in the best interests of their people 12. In this
way, the group is able to maintain its individuality within the state (Kymlicka
1995, 27). Autonomy is necessary for these reasons, as well as allowing a group
economic, social and political rights (Gurr 1993, 79-82).
Milton Esman discusses two types of autonomy. The first type of autonomy
is territorial, or segmental, autonomy that may be used when an ethnic group is
geographically concentrated. Territorial autonomy is a mild form of self
determination according to Esman. In order for territorial autonomy to work, the
12

lt should be noted that Autonomy is not always a solution to ethnic conflict, nor does it always settle
a group's claim of independence.
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ethnic group should be geographically concentrated. Federalism allows for this
type of autonomy 'because it facilitates the sharing of two identities: regional and
national' and allows for participation at the center to 'convey a role of decision
making in executive as well as legislative institutions' (Esman 1994, 223).
Non-territorial cultural autonomy on the other hand applies to a group not
concentrated in a particular territory. This form of autonomy allows "minority
ethnic communities to operate, at public expense, their own language and even to
maintain tribunals that apply to their own legal system in disputes among members
of their community" (Esman 1994, 224). As Esman notes, cultural autonomy takes
toleration in an ethnically mixed state, but if it works it can be an effective method
of conflict management.
Esman points out that regional or territorial autonomy has been able to
stabilize relationships various groups, including the Walloons and Flemings in
Belgium, a German speaking minority in Italy and Christians and Muslims in
Turkey (223-224). Due to its stabilizing factors, territorial autonomy would work
best in Iraq as a means of conflict regulation. In regional autonomy, the groups
would practice cultural autonomy, as the Kurds have been since 1991.
Ted Gurr also argues for regional autonomy. Gurr states that regional
autonomy is less threatening and a less costly alternative to civil war and
secession. Gurr points out that regional autonomy is more negotiable than
independence. There are five types of arrangements he points to that can be made
to accommodate autonomists' demands: confederalism, federalism, territorial
autonomy, regional administrative decentralization, and community autonomism.
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Territorial autonomy is not necessarily the same as federalism as regional
autonomy does not mean self-governance. Federalism allows for
overrepresentation in smaller subdivisions of the 'federal' chamber (Lijphart 1977,
42). Within any of these types of arrangements groups in dispute are better able to
work out any of the following: groups rights to use its own cultural aspects
(language, religion, etc), control of its land and resources, resource development
within group preferences, funding from the central government for infrastructure
development (education, medical and welfare), control of internal security,
participation in state decisions, and protection of the rights of its members (Gurr
1993, 299). Democratically, these means can be achieved through pluralism and
power-sharing within a federal state according to Gurr (306).
Kymlicka argues for autonomy, through federalism, for the same reasons
that Gurr does. For Kymlicka, in order to protect minority groups rights through
autonomy a liberal style democracy will need to be created that will accommodate
cultural differences, and protect civil and political rights of individuals (26). For
Kymlicka cultural diversity arises when previously self-governing, territorially
concentrated cultures are incorporated into one state. This formation results in
'national minorities' that will wish to maintain themselves as distinct societies
alongside a majority culture and will demand "various forms of autonomy or self
government too ensure their survival as distinct societies" (10). For Kymlicka,
autonomy through federalism is the way in which these goals can be achieved.
Mohammad Rabie's shared homeland model is another form of autonomy.
The shared homeland model is a combination of both territorial and cultural
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autonomy in the respect that it allows ethnic minorities to be either culturally
independent from the state, full autonomy within the existing society, limited self
rule, cultural autonomy, and control over specific matters, such as religious
practice (Rabie 1994, 177). The shared homeland model requires that the various
entities share their national or group resources with the other autonomous political
entities or independent states that emerge at the end of the state building process.
The model further divides national minorities into different cultural groups, but
individual, economic, and social concerns would remain united. The end result of
the shared homeland model is that it would "permit several political entities to
coexist harmoniously within one homeland, while preserving their separate
national identities and cultural sovereignties" (Rabie, 1994, 180).
Finally Lijphart argues that segmental autonomy allows the minority to rule
itself in its own concern. This increases the plural nature of the society, which as
Lijphart argues is the idea because it allows "the segments to turn into constructive
elements of democracy" (Lijphart 1977, 42). The natural outgrowth of autonomy
as we have seen is federalism.
One time critic of federalism Donald Horowitz has also acknowledged the
importance of regional autonomy and federalism on conflict reduction. Horowitz
argues that "territory can partition groups off from each other and direct their
political ambitions at one level of government, rather than another" (Horowitz
2002, 25). Horowitz acknowledges that regional autonomy can foster intra group
competition and promote political stabilization. Political stabilization occurs when
politicians of different groups need to interact at the center. Incentives can create
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autonomous regions preventing secession, which drives politicians to the center
and lead them to concentrating on their regional units for satisfaction (25).
Eric Nordlinger docs not support federalism. He argues that it can exacerbate
the conflict and allows the dominant segment to ignore or negate the demands of
the minority (Nordlinger 1972, 31). Instead Nordlinger proposes a 'purposive
depoliticization'. Essentially this conflict-regulating practice is a less decentralized
than in a federal system. In the purposive depoliticized system "group leaders
agree not to involve the government in public policy areas which impinge upon the
segments values and interests" (26). He further argues that this process may be
effective in containing the conflict at a particular level and may even help dampen
it. Despite his attitude towards federalism, Nordlinger still encourages some form
of autonomy in depoliticization.
Regional autonomy is a very important element in conflict regulation and
creating a stable democracy. In order to achieve it, a federalist style system is
required. However, the question becomes what kind of federalist system will allow
for regional autonomy: asymmetrical or symmetrical federalism? Yash Ghai states
that ethnically based federations or regional autonomies have different structures
and orientations from federations like the United States and Australia (Ghai 2002,
157). Ethnic federations tend to 'emphasize diversity and multiplicity of values'.
Several other aspects make ethnic federalism different from US-style federalism.
These include an emphasis on self-rule rather than shared rule, division of powers
focused on cultural matters, differing party structures, which includes no
connection between national and regional parties, and finally asymmetrical
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features of the ethnic federations as opposed to more symmetrical features of
classical federations (158).
Charles Tarlton gives a good explanation of why an ethnic federation must
be asymmetrical. An asymmetrical or symmetrical state will determine its
"participation in the pattern of social, cultural, economic and political
characteristics of the federal system of which it is a part" (Tarlton 1965, 861).
Briefly the symmetrical model of federalism treats every unit as equal in terms of
economic factors, population, cultural patterns, etc. In contrast the asymmetrical
model treats the individual regions as unique and requires the federalist system to
respond to the specific social structures within that region (868-869). If regional
autonomy is a means to overcome conflict, the asymmetrical model of federalism
may be more suitable.
Federalism may provide autonomy to groups if the respective groups are
geographically concentrated. Lijphart notes that federalism supports the goal of all
democratic conflict reducing institutions. It decentralizes the state via four
elements: bicameralism, strong and active judicial review, constitutional rigidity,
and degree of independence of the central bank (Lijphart 2002, 52). Only the first
two elements are related to the consensus style democracy. In the case of this
paper the first element, bicameralism, is important because it offers additional
safeguards for minority interests and autonomy (52). In divided society, the
bicameral legislature might resemble the US Congress, with the exception that the
representatives are elected on ethnic terms rather than population. In this type of
model, the lower house would be formed via population, and thus the largest
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ethnic group would control the majority of seats. However, the upper house would
have equal representation among the ethnic groups, thus allowing smaller groups
to be better represented.
Segmental autonomy fosters the plural nature of a society (Lijphart 1977,
42). Both Gurr and Esman give credence to pluralism which according to Gurr is
"an orientation that gives greater weight to the collective-rights and interests of
minorities" (Gurr 1993, 309). For Gurr pluralism means 'equal individual and
collective rights'. While he notes the economic advantages of pluralism which
means a shift from programs that enhance individual opportunity towards
programs that allocate jobs and resources on the basis of ethnicity, it is the political
advantages that are most relevant for this paper. Politically, pluralism leads to the
emergence of institutionalized ethnic politics. This allows political parties to
ensure that communal interests will be represented in decision making (310).

Power Sharing
Power sharing is another important element that is important to the
stabilization of ethnic conflict in democracy. Lijphart defines power sharing as the
formation of a government through a "grand coalition of the political leaders of all
significant segments of the plural society" (Lijphart 1977, 25). For the purposes of
this paper, I have broadened the definition of power sharing to refer to the sharing
of central government power by different ethnic groups. However, power sharing
is different from autonomy because it refers to governing through coalition
cabinets. While autonomy allows the ethnic groups to self-govern in their
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respective regions, power sharing divides power among the ethnic groups at the
national level of government. Esman notes that power sharing is an
accommodative method that is subject to "continual strain and [is] vulnerable
breakdowns" (Esman 1994, 258). Instead, Esman proposes multiethnic coalitions
because they "can insure that ethnic communities or factions within them
participate in government" (Esman 1994, 258). Based ori this redefining of the
term, in this section power sharing may include a stable governing coalition
(Nordlinger 1972), electoral incentives to bring together various ethnic factions
(Reilly (2001) and Horowitz (1985 and 2002)), arenas of bargaining (Reilly 2001),
and grand coalition (Lijphart 1977).
Nordlinger proposed the stable governing coalition as one of his six points of
conflict regulating practices. He states that coalitions are formed prior to an
election with an "avowed aim of conflict regulation" (Nordlinger 1972, 21).
However how these coalitions are brought into being is left unanswered. Reilly
and Horowitz argue that appropriate incentives facilitate the formation of
coalitions because the groups would need to accommodate one another to form the
coalition (Reilly 2001, 11).
The use of incentives in coalition building comes from the theory of
centripetalism. Centripetalism has been shown not to work with Fiji as an
example. In the 1999 election, Fiji's main political parties attempted vote pooling,
but the deals reached undermined the prospects for interethnic accommodation.
This resulted in a coup the following year (Reilly 2001, 124). Centripetalism also
assumes that institutional incentives for interethnic accommodation must be
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strong, yet in Sri Lanka they were weak and the result was that these weak
incentives eventually undermined the governing coalition's effectiveness (Reilly
2001, 125). Despite these drawbacks, centripetalism may still hold some elements
that may be necessary for my framework. In Democracy in Divided Society
Benjamin Reilly states that three phenomena occur in a centripetal society. These
are electoral incentives, arenas of bargaining, and the fonnation of centrist,
aggregative, political parties. Electoral incentives are needed for a candidate to
reach out and attract votes from a range of ethnic groups other than their own. The
result is moderate political rhetoric (11 ). In Iraq this may not be attractive for
political candidates, but may be necessary. An article in the New York Times from
September 18, 2007 notes that internal migration in Iraq is reshaping the country's
ethnic and sectarian landscape (refer to the intro for more detailed numbers about
the internal migration). Specifically the Sunni are moving north and west, and
Shi'a south. While this is due to the Sunni being forced out of their homes because
of violence, the fact cannot be escaped that this migration is reshaping Iraq's
ethnic areas (NYTimes, Sep 18, 2007). The result may be that a Shi'a candidate
will need to appeal to a Su1mi population and this may tone down political
rhetoric. If a Shi'a' voter would vote for a Sunni candidate, or vice versa, remains
to be seen.
Reilly notes that arenas of bargaining bring together political actors from
different groups with an incentive to bargain and negotiate for cross partisan and
cross ethnic ideals (Reilly 2001, 110). In Iraq as a whole this may not work, but in
an area such as Baghdad where there is a large cross-cutting cleavage of ethnic
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groups, a moderate candidate may emerge. For the rest oflraq, a grand coalition as
outlined by Lijphart may be the only logical choice for Iraq.
The grand coalition as explained by Lijphart is characterized by the
participation of leaders from all significant segments of the plural society (Lijphart
1977, 31). Further Lijphart states that grand coalitions have been able to achieve
stability and unity during "critical transitional periods by° stilling partisan passions
and strengthening consensus" (Lijhart 1977, 29). In order to form the grand
coalition, an attitude of moderation is required (31).
Lijphart notes that a grand coalition defies one of the principles of
democracy: that there should be a strong opposition party. At the same time it fails
the turnover and two-turnover test that are used to measure stable democracy (40).
However, as he notes, this is a view of democracy that consists of a majoritarian
minority relation, which is exactly what both this framework and the authors of the
cited works are trying to avoid in divided societies.
Gurr notes two problems of power sharing. The first is that power sharing
arrangements are not easily constructed, especially when the groups are unequal to
begin with (311 ). He looks to Horowitz who states that power sharing is more
feasible in unranked systems. In a ranked system political, economic, and social
status are cumulative so that one group is subordinate to another. Iraq resembled a
ranked structure where the Sunni were always the dominant group since the time
of the Ottoman Empire. However, in the last ten years oflraq's history the country
has become an unranked society in which the ethnic (and in this case) religious
groups are internally stratified and autonomous as a whole society (Horowitz
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1985, 22-32). Due to the unranked nature of the society, Iraq is a suitable
candidate for power-sharing.
The second problem Gurr notes is that in some cases one group is more
advantaged than another (311). In Iraq's case the Sunni who were once dominant
are now the disadvantaged group, creating a potential problem for power sharing.
In order to avoid such a situation Gurr cautions that policies of accommodation
must be pursued slowly and that nonviolent means are preferred so that groups that
may be potential allies are not alienated (312-13). Finally, in accordance with
Reilly and Horowitz's moderation tactics, Gurr identifies one key to constructive
management of etlmo political conflict is to "search out politically and socially
creative policies that bridge the gaps between the interests of the minorities and the
state" (313). The other tactic Gurr mentions is to begin conflict management at the
early stages of open conflict. Unfortunately this opportunity has passed in Iraq.
In consociational theory closely allied with power sharing is the concept of
the mutual veto. Nordlinger explains that the mutual veto "provides that
governmental decisions cannot be taken unless they are acceptable to all major
conflict organizations" (25). While a compromising method, the mutual veto is
important because it guarantees power to weaker segments of society and
encourages them to disavow violent politics. Lijphart argues against the notion that
the mutual veto will lead to a tyranny by the minority by stating that it is a weapon
that all minority segments have and can use. Thus it also protects minority rights
by allowing the minority group a means by which to override decisions by a
majority group. Further more, it provides security which means its use is unlikely
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because each interest is self-protected, the struggle for power is prevented, and
attachment to it is weakened and everyone's ability to use it is suppressed. Finally
each group will realize the potential for deadlock from unrestrained use ofthe veto
and will not use it frequently (Lijphart 1977, 37).

The Proportionality Principle
Proportionality allows for "all groups [to] influence a decision in proportion
to their numerical strength" (Nordlinger 1972, 23). While power sharing brings the
ethnic groups together at the national government level, proportionality allows for
the groups to receive allocations ofgovernment aid, welfare, etc in accordance to
their size. Nordlinger points to several ways in which the principle of
proportionality may be applied as a conflict managing tool. Elective and
appointive governmental positions may be distributed according to the
proportional size of their respective segments. Proportionality may also be applied
to the government's allocation ofresources to the various segments ofsociety.
However for this paper it is important to note one aspect ofproportionality.
Nordlinger states that it "reduces the degree and scope ofcompetition for
governerable power, administrative positions and scarce resources ..." (Nordlinger
1972, 23).
Lijphart agrees with the notion that proportionality allows for a fairer
allocation ofcivil service appointments and financial resources among the
different segments. Secondly because it is neutral and impartial, proportionality
removes potentially divisive problems from decision making processes and thus
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eases the burden on the government. Finally proportionality translates voting into
parliamentary seats as stated above (Lijphart 1977, 38-40).
It is not surprising that Kymlicka would agree that proportionality an
essential means to preserve individual and minority rights. For Kymlicka group
representation is important in a society. Proportionality encourages 'ticket
balancing' and makes under representation more visible (Kymlicka 1995, 134).
Proportionality, Kymlicka points out, leads to a more representative legislature
than single-member majoritarian systems and allows for group representation to
take place. Group representation is an important element for democracy because it
can be seen as a response to disadvantaged groups' views and interests and allows
the said group to be better represented (141). Thus proportionality leads to group
representation which allows disadvantaged groups to take part in government.

Minority Rights
Kymlicka puts forth the idea that in a multicultural or divided society,
"universal rights, assigned to individuals regardless of group membership, and
certain group-differentiated rights or 'special statuses for minority cultures" must
be guaranteed (Kymlicka 1995, 6). Through the elements outlined and discussed
above, a single party majority can be reduced and individual liberal rights secured
in a divided society.
We have seen how Kymlicka defends federalism and PR because they
protect individual and minority group rights, but there is one more aspect that
should be provided for. Kymlicka notes that ethnic groups will make demands on
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the state to protect against discrimination and prejudice. These demands are
referred to as "polyethnic rights", which "are intended to help ethnic groups and
religious minorities express their cultural particularity and pride without it
hampering their success in the economic and political institutions of the dominant
society" (31). Polyethnicity is important because intended to integrate groups into
the larger society. Thus in a fractional state like Iraq, including ethnic groups is
important so that secession does not occur, and instead stability is created
(Kymlicka 1995, 177-78).
The above framework will be used to assess the Iraqi institutions in the final
chapter.
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CHAPTER IV
POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS IN IRAQ

I employ the framework developed in Chapter Two to assess the
appropriateness of the current political institutions in Iraq. Since October 2005,
Iraq has been governed by the Constitution of Iraq (2005), which replaced the
interim constitution known as the Law of Administration for the State of Iraq for
the Transitional Period (TAL). Chapter's 3, 4, and 5 of the Iraqi Constitution
outline the shape of the government, while Chapters 1 and 2 discuss the Basic
Principles and Rights and Freedoms of the Iraqi people. In this chapter, Chapter's
3,4, and 5 of the Iraqi Constitution will be closely examined and compared with
the similar provisions of the TAL and the Iraqi Constitution from 1970-2003. This
comparison will focus on three political institutions: federal versus unitary state,
an electoral method, and presidential versus parliamentary government. The
current institutions will be compared against other experts' institutional
recommendations for Iraq as well.
The Brookings Institute (2007) places Iraq at a freedom index of 5.05 on a
ten point scale, with one being the lowest score and ten the highest. The indicators
of freedom for this measurement look at election of the head of government,
election of parliament, fairness of electoral laws, right to organize political parties,
power of elected representatives, presence of an opposition, transparency, minority
representation, level of corruption, freedom of assembly, independence of the
judiciary, press freedom, religious freedom, rule of law, and property rights
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(Brookings Institute 2007). Lebanon has a freedom index of 6.55, and Israel 8.20.
In its region, Iraq places fairly high on the freedom index, with neighbors Iran and
Syria ranking 3.85 and 2.80, respectively. However, globally Iraq places a 6 on
both political and civil liberties scores due to the growing violence and insecurity
(Freedom House: Iraq 2007) 13 . Despite this high placement in the region, the level
of violence, discussed in the introduction, suggests that, among other things, the
current democratic institutions may be insufficient to end the ethnic tensions. My
goals in this chapter is to asses the current formal political institutions in Iraq
against the framework established in Chapter 2, review other institutional
recommendations for managing the ethnic violence in Iraq, and finally conclude
with my recommendations.

Democracy and Islam
Article 1 of the Iraqi Constitution states "Islam is the official religion of the
State and is a foundation source of legislation" (Iraqi Constitution, 2005). This
point is important since it has been argued that Western style democracy is
incompatible with Islam (Huntington1997), and that Islam is undemocratic in
nature. However, Indonesia (with a Freedom House ranking of two for political
rights and three for civil liberties) is an example of a country with a large Muslim
population and a democracy (Freedom House: Indonesia 2007). Indonesia's
success at maintaining a large Muslim population and democracy is attributed to a
moderate form of Islam (Indonesian Matters, 2005). Other countries with a large

13

I indicates the highest level of freedom, 7 the lowest.
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Muslim population include Malaysia that has a four in both political rights and
civil liberties, and Turkey is at level three in both categories (Freedom House:
Turkey 2007). In Malaysia Islam and democracy exist together through a program
known as "Islam Hadhari". Islam Hadhari is a form of government derived from
the basic principles of the Qur'an. A moderate form of political Islam, Islam
Hadhari emphasizes modernization techniques that are consistent with Islam
(Bashir, 2005). In Turkey, the ruling party's (Justice and Development Party,
AKP) politics are similar to Christian Democratic parties in Europe. The AKP
respects traditional Islamic tradition, values and cultural values, while at the same
time promoting political values of democracy, rule of law and human rights
(Bilici, 2007). These three examples offer proof that democracy and some form of
moderate Islam can coexist with democracy. How democracy may work in
Muslim societies is the focus of this subsection.
In the Middle East, the term 'state' should not be considered the san1e as it is
in the West. In many Middle Eastern countries, the state is considered in religious
terms, and encompasses persons beyond the territorial boundaries of individual
states (Vatikiotis 1988, 60). The individual states are beholden to the Qur'an and
the supremacy oflslam. States such as Iran under Shah Pahlavi and Lebanon made
attempts to create secular states and collapsed when Islamism 14 prevailed against
the secular forces. Notions of power and authority are based on religious ideology
and suggest that in order for a regime to exist in the Middle East it must
incorporate Islam (Vatikiotis 1988, 60-61).

14

Islamism is the term given to extremist Islamic thought (Nydell 2006, 103).
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Interestingly enough, Iraq was one state in the Middle East that had
maintained a relatively secular government under the rule of Saddam Hussein. The
secular state had been established in Article 1 of the 1970 Iraqi Constitution
(which would remain in place until its replacement by the TAL in 2004), which
stated that the objective of the state oflraq is to create one Arab state and further
the socialist system (Iraq Interim Constitution 1970). Contradicting Article 1,
Islam was established as the religion of the state in Article 4. During his rule,
Hussein and the I3a'ath Party would pursue objectives contrary to Islam yet court
Islamic values as a means ofintimidation and patronage (Tripp 2002, 217).
However, through modernization movements Hussein and the Ba'ath Party
extended rights to women, such as allowing them to serve in high level
government positions, not seen in surrounding Islamic countries. Further secular
moves by Hussein included abolishing Islamic Law in favor of a Western Style
legal system, making Iraq the only country in the Middle East not to be led by
Islamic Law (al-Zainy 1995). Hussein's modernization and secularization of the
state oflraq was done to the ire of the theocratic Shi'a. With the Shi'a now in
control of the government, the state of Iraq has become more theocratic. However
as demonstrated in the examples of Turkey, Malaysia and Indonesia it would
appear that in order for democracy to survive in Iraq, a moderate form of Islam
may need to be pursued.
In Islam it has been argued that sovereignty belongs to God, as opposed to
liberal democracy in which it is placed in the hands of the individual. However,
the more proper view, according to some, is that Islam has always had a point of
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'ad!, or justice, which is similar to the Western democracy version of freedom
(Ibrahim 2006, 6-7). Further, the maquasid al-shari 'a (higher objectives of the
shari 'a 15) preserves all religion, life, intellect, family and wealth, ideas that are
also found in Lockean liberalism. Freedom of conscience, freedom of expression,
and sanctity of life and property are also present in the Qur'an, demonstrating that
Islam is not incompatible with democracy (Ibrahim 2006, 7). It is also argued that
elements of a constitutional democracy and civil society are explained as moral
imperatives in Islam. Morally, freedom of conscience, freedom of expression and
sanctity of life and property are outlined in the Qur'an (Ibrahim 2006, 7).
However, as explained below, the absence of democracy in the Arab world is the
result of militant Islam, which is a reaction against Western influence in the
region.
Scholars such as Huntington (1996) and Fukuyama (1992) have argued that
Islam is a monolithic faith based on the assumption that it is devoid of
individualism, liberalism and political freedoms. It is also argued that Islamic
culture, Islamic interpretations and Islamic religiosity do not allow for democracy
in the Islamic countries. According to Jamal, scholars know "very little about the
conditions under which Islam reinforces views that are supportive of either
democracy or Islamism" (Jamal 2006, 54). Further there appears to be very little
data about the ways that "Islam structures individual-and-community-level support
for democracy as well as Islamism in the [Middle East]" (Jamal 2006, 54).
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Shari'a refers to lslamic law derived from the Qur'an, the Sunna of the Prophet, consensus of the
community, and legal reasoning of the jurists (Esack 2005, 113-114).
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There should be no reason to think that an Islamic democracy would not
work in Iraq based on the arguments above. Indeed Iraq has had a more secular
history than some other Middle East nations. They also had a history of
neighborhood self-government that has worked within religious institutions. The
idea that democracy lies within the people is summed up in the following quote by
Thomas Jefferson: "[The people] are in truth the only legitimate proprietors of the
soil and government" (Jefferson on Politics 2007). Jefferson's quote applies to Iraq
where, despite the authoritarian nature of the regimes in its history, some form of
· democratic practices was carried out in churches, synagogues and mosques. These
informal meeting places settled matters of dispute among neighbors. Professionals
in Iraq, such as engineers, lawyers, teachers, and doctors, created participatory
politics in the form of unions. While the Ba'ath Party co-opted and twisted these
informal institutions, they have not disappeared (Polk 2005, 196-197). These
associations and institutions may contribute in the democratization process. These
informal institutions may maintain and support the formal institutions discussed
below.

Federal versus Unitary State
Article 4 of the TAL established Iraq as a federal system with powers
"shared between the federal government, govemorates, municipalities, and local
administration" (Article 4). The federal government established in the TAL was
upheld in the Iraqi Constitution and is further explained in Section 5, Chapter 1 of
the Constitution which establishes the "authority of the regions". There are
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provisions in the constitution that allow for each region to establish its own
constitution, provided it does not contradict the Iraqi Constitution (Article 120),
and establishment of regional powers that include the right of regional
governments to exercise executive, legislative, and judicial power in accordance
with the Constitution (Article 121, Part 1). Other provisions include the individual
regions' ability to have an equitable share of national revenues, the regional
government's ability to amend the application of national legislation within its
boundaries, and establishment of internal security forces (Article 121, Part 2-5).
Finally Iraq's regions are established from the 18 governorates established under
the TAL (Iraqi Constitution, Chapter 5, Part 1). "Governorate Councils" are
created from the governors of these regions. A large degree of decentralization is
allowed.
Briefly, a unitary system is not appropriate for a divided society. In a unitary
state, such as the United Kingdom for example, local govermnents perform
important functions, but they are subservient to the central government and their
powers are not constitutionally guaranteed (Lijphart 1999, 17). Further, unitary
states lack divisions of political power, which means that competition among
groups is always at a national level, rather than a local level. As previously
described, local governments in unitary states are merely administrative bodies,
which execute policies of the center. Because of this, policymaking power in a
unitary state tends to be unilateral, as opposed to federal states in which power is a
combination of decisions between the national and local governments (Cohen
1997, 3). In a state as fractionalized as Iraq, local autonomy and self-government
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is important and a unitary state would not meet the needs oflraq's various groups.
As explained by the United Kingdom example, the central government in a unitary
state could deny regional groups such as the Kurds certain rights, such as religious
practice. Thus in order to uphold regional and cultural autonomy and allow for
self-government, a federal system is needed.
Federalism is a political philosophy that champions "shared" and "self'
government entities. This philosophy is compatible with several federal systems
such as confederations federations, federacies, associated states, leagues, and cross
border authorities. Federation is the system, which is established in the TAL and
formalized in the 2005 Iraqi Constitution (O'Leary 2005, 51). By the TAL's
distinction, a federation is seen as two governmental powers units, the federal and
regional, enjoying constitutionally separate powers. At the same time, these units
may have concurrent or shared powers (O'Leary 2005, 51). The federal system in
Iraq is based upon "geographic and historical realities and separation of powers,
and not upon origin, race, ethnicity, nationality or confession" (TAL 2002). In the
Iraqi Constitution the federal system is discussed merely as having a
"decentralized capital, regions, and governorates as well as local administrations"
(Iraqi Constitution, Article 116, 2005).
The elements of federalism are in place for Iraq. While the TAL provided
for a majoritarian federation, the Iraqi Constitution provides for a much higher
level of decentralization. In the majoritarian federation, political power is
concentrated at the federal level and it "facilitates executive and legislative
dominance of either through a popularly endorsed executive president, or through
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a single-party prime minister and cabinet which has the confidence of the federal
house of represcntatives" (O'Leary 2005, 53). In order for the TAL to be amended,
a three-fourths majority and approval of the presidential council was required
(Article 3). This same majority was required in order for the bill of rights to be
abridged, extending the TAL, delaying elections, or reducing the power of the
regions or governorates (O'Leary 2005, 52). Thus under· the TAL a super majority
was required for changes to the TAL.
In the Iraqi Constitution however more power is given to the citizens to
amend the constitution. Similar to the approval of the Iraqi Constitution, any
amendment is put to a referendum vote which requires approval by a majority of
voters. If approved, the amendment must not be rejected by two-thirds majority in
three or more governorates (Article 142). There is also a provision for amendment
of the Constitution in Article 126, which states that approval by two-thirds of the
Cow1cil of Ministers and approval by a majority in a referendum is needed.
While the Iraqi Constitution grants more of a role to the people in changing
the constitution than the TAL, it is still majoritarian in nature. Instead the
alternative to the majoritarian federation is the consensual federation. Consensual
federation has "inclusive executive power sharing and representative arrangements
in the federal government, institutionalizes proportional principles of
representation and allocation of public posts and resources" and has a separation of
powers, bill of rights, monetary institutions and courts, which are protected from
the immediate power of the federal government (O'Leary 2005, 53).
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Brendan O'Leary argues that it would be in the best interest for Iraq to adopt
the consensual federation as opposed to the majoritarian federation. In the latter he
argues that the Kurds in particular would face the possible loss of their linguistic,
national, and cultural identities at the hands of an Arab or Shi'a majority. Likewise
the Sunni face the same problem, and would want to seek a constraining federal
system (O'Leary 2005. 53).
O'Leary (2005) argues for consensual federations because of the way they
balance out the bicameral legislation. By separating the legislative and executive
branches, a consensual federation is able to create two powerful chambers one of
which represents the constituent regions (55). Under the TAL Iraq was not a full
federation due to its lack of two chambers. Previously mentioned is the fact that
while provisions are in place for an upper house in the 2005 Iraqi Constitution, it
has yet to be enacted. As mentioned previously, Iraq has a majoritarian style
federation in which a simple majority is needed to pass laws in the Parliament. As
pointed out earlier, the Shi'a holds close to 50 percent of the seats in the National
Assembly. When the number of Arab party seats is added (44 seats for the Sunni
Iraqi Accordance Front and a further 25 for the Shiite/Sunni National Iraq List
party) this brings the total number of Arab party seats in the National Assembly to
197, or about 72 percent of the seats (Brookings Institution 2007). The result is
that the non-Arab parties are clearly in the minority and would require a second
chamber to defend their interests. How that can be done is discussed below.
Federalism and territorial autonomy are two of the most debated aspects in
Iraq's current system. The Kurds first had their demands met in the TAL and

67
formalized in Chapter 1 and 5 of the Iraqi Constitution, which grants them ethnic
federalism. However, religious autonomy was not addressed in the TAL, while in
Chapter 1 Article 2 of the Iraqi Constitution Islam is the official religion and any
passage of a law that contradicts Islam (note: not Islamic Law) is barred. This
interpretation is vague and is open to interpretation by whoever (rather Shi'a or
Sunni) is in the power of authority. Religious rights are ·also established in article
2, where Iraq is recognized as a multiethnic, multi-religious, and multi-sect
country that permits all religions and sects to practice religion freely. In the
"Declaration of the Shi'a oflraq", the Shi'a demanded autonomy for "teaching
circles" and the right to establish their own schools, universities and other teaching
institutions that would permit them to teach their religion (Anderson, Stansfield
2004, 195-96). Because of this, both Kurdish and Arabic are established as the
official languages of the state, and all documents, public addresses, schools, etc are
published in both languages (Article 4, Section 2).
These provisions are much more liberal than the Constitution under Saddam
Hussein. The 1970 constitution established Arabic as the official language, only
recognizing the Kurdish language and people in their region. Further, almost no
autonomy was granted to the regions. This seems to be because of the socialist
agenda of the I3a'ath party. Instead the state assumed all responsibility for
economic activity and did not allow any independent private economic activities
(Iraq Interim Constitution 1970). It was clear that when the current Iraqi
Constitution was being drafted, the authors were trying to dismiss all elements of
the Ba'ath Constitution.
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There are others who argue that the Sunni will not accept federalism, since it
would still keep Iraq unified under Shi'a domination (Galbraith 2006, 201). While
the constitution allows for the Shi'a and Sunni to form their own institutions of
self-government, it still contains power in the central government. The solution
proposed by Galbraith and others is a three state partition among the groups
(Galbraith 2006, 206). In the US Senate, Senator's Biden and Brownback suppo11
a similar solution with a loose confederation of the regions of Iraq. In this model,
there is a Kurdish region in the north, a Shi'a region in the south, and a Sunni
region in the central region. Baghdad would have little power other than managing
oil revenues (Biden, 2007). Both Galbraith and the Biden-Brownback Amendment
claim that Iraq's breakup is inevitable, and that hope for a unified state has passed.
If too much power is decentralized, as Galbraith and the Biden-Brownback
Amendment suggest, a breakup of the state of Iraq could occur due to a lack of a
central governing power. That is, without anything to unify the regions, such as the
promise of government funding for education, welfare, infrastructure, etc, the
regions would be free to pursue their own agendas with no incentive to support the
state.
It has been concluded that Iraq will need to have a federalist system because
a unitary state, as noted above, will not allow for all of the ethnic group's needs to
be met. However the question is what degree of federalism will work in Iraq? To
promote power sharing, the consensual federal system has advantages over both
the majoritarian federations and the highly decentralized separatist model of
federalism described above. Besides maintaining the state of Iraq, the consensual
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design would allow for the minority groups to be represented, as well as allow for
proportionality to occur. The bicameral legislation would give the lesser groups in
Iraq, the Sunni and Kurds, better representation proportionally via an upper house
(the currently non-existent Federation Council). Since the Parliament is currently a
majoritarian unicameral legislature, there is no opportunity for minority groups to
be represented. Further, the way in which a bicameral legislation is enacted in Iraq
under the constitution (with the Council of Union being created by the Council of
Representatives which is explained in more detail below) this makes one house
subservient to the other and betrays an important aspect of federalism: two
balanced powerful houses elected by different constituencies.
Finally, because it still has a unicameral legislature in practice (as noted
above the second chamber has, as of December 2007, yet to be created), the
current Iraqi parliament fails to meet the power sharing element of my framework.
A minority group such as the Kurds and Sunni may not have an equal share of
power as the Shi'a (who holds 128 of the 275 seats, which are about 47 percent of
the legislature) (Brookings Institute 2007). Without having a bicameral legislation,
it is difficult to ensure proportional representation and protect the rights of the
minority groups (the Sunni and Kurds). However, when the Federation Council is
created it may still fall short of bicameral legislation. According to Article 65, the
Council of Union (Federation Council) will be formed by a law enacted by two
thirds of the members of the Council of Representatives. Further the Council of
Representatives regulates membership conditions, competencies and "all that is
connected with it" (Iraqi Constitution 2005, Article 65). This gives the Council of

70
Representatives absolute authority over the Council of Union, thus contradicting
the purposes of a bicameral legislature.
In order to meet the democratic framework I have discussed, the Council of
Union needs to remove population as a means for representation. On what grounds
its members are to be chosen remains to be seen. This aspect goes beyond the
reaches of this paper and warrants further research. However, in order for the
Council of Union to be an effective powerful second chamber some other means of
representation is needed.
Historical precedence has suggested that it is unlikely that one branch of
government would relinquish more power to another. Since the Council of Union's
provisions is delayed until the next Parliamentary elections, perhaps this will allow
for time and hindsight to take hold and influence the Council of Representatives
decisions regarding the structure and rules of the Council of Union. While it
would be naive to think that the Iraqi Constitution could be amended to allow the
Council of Union its own power, at best what could occur is that provisions will be
built in that will allow for the Council of Union to gradually attain more autonomy
and legislative authority than currently provided. Making the Council of Union
powerful is a necessary step in order to ensure that all oflraq's minority groups are
represented in the government. However as it stands the idea of one chamber of
Parliament creating a second subservient chamber is a major design flaw that will
have to be amended and fixed for the aforementioned reasons.

71
Electoral Method
The Constitution of Iraq makes no mention of the type of electoral method to
be implemented in Iraq. The January 2005 elections were carried out under the
proportional representation system established in the TAL. In this election, the
entire country was treated as a single constituency and seats were allotted
according to the party's share of the national vote (Brown 2007, 7). The only
provision on elections currently in the Constitution of Iraq is a "Supreme
Independent Commission for Elections". Since democracy is not advancing in
Iraq (which is the reason for its decrease in the Freedom House score from a five
to a six and a changed status of "free" to "not free"), little has been done about an
electoral system, meaning that the only basis for the elections currently resides in
the TAL.
Under the TAL, a closed list proportional representation electoral system
was established. In this system, the entire country is treated as a single electoral
district (UN Iraq Electoral Sheet, 2005). In the elections, political parties,
associations and independent candidates that collect at least 500 signatures may
run for election. Any groups associated with militias are not able to register. A
natural threshold 16, determined by the number of votes cast, must be crossed in
order for a candidate or party to gain entry into the National Assembly
(Independent Electoral Commission oflraq, 2004).

16

"The natural threshold is calculated by dividing the total number of valid votes by the number of
seats on the council" (Seat Allocations, IECI Regulation 17/2005)
http://www.iecirag.org/img/PDF/RulesAndRegulations English/I ECIReg%2017-05%20%20Seat%20al Jocation%20-%20final.pdf
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Of the available electoral methods Iraq could have chosen, PR would have
been better alternative to semi-proportional and plurality-majority systems and
vote-pooling. Plurality-majority systems promote a winner-take all situations,
which would have alienated many oflraq's factions because they could not gain a
reasonable portion of the vote. Semi-proportional systems, which combine PR and
majoritarianism of plurality-majority systems, require e·ach elector to vote only
once, but allow that voter to distribute the number of seats between different
candidates. The candidates with the highest number of votes fill these seats (Reilly
2001, 15-17). Finally in PR, voters vote for a party rather than an individual
candidate.
If the goal of the electoral method was to allow for as much representation
and moderation as possible at the national level, Iraq could have chosen the
alternate vote-pooling method. Vote pooling promotes moderation on ethnic issues
because it requires parties to pool all votes in an electoral arena (Horowitz 1985,
396). Reilly agrees with Horowitz's notion of vote pooling on the grounds that it
enables politicians to campaign for 'second choice' votes of electors which would
go to a candidate from another ethnic group, while the first choice of the voter is to
their respective etlmic group (Reilly 2001, 10). Reilly's electoral system of vote
pooling is the 'preferential vote'. This system, by Reilly's definition, enables
electors to rank candidates in the order of their choice on the ballot while
providing parties and candidates in divided societies with an incentive to 'pool
votes' (Reilly 2001, 21). Like Horowitz, Reilly's main goal is to promote
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moderation at a local level, rather than expecting leaders to act accommodatingly
after an election (Reilly 2001, 22).
Vote pooling as a whole is not a better alternative than PR for Iraq, but it
does include elements that may be helpful to foster democracy that PR does not
include. I reject vote pooling as an alternative electoral method for Iraq for the
main reason that vote pooling requires moderate action by all parties. Given the
level of violence that is being seen in Iraq, for parties to take a moderate approach
seems unlikely. Instead, moderation may have to be forced, which is why I use
only certain elements of vote pooling.
The element of vote pooling that is important here is the encouragement of
moderate actions by parties. This would allow for better inner party cooperation
and coalitions. Further in PR the only incentive to create a coalition is when no
party obtains a majority of the seats. There is no moderating incentive to form a
coalition. Vote pooling provides a solution to that problem by having electors rank
order their candidates. This would mean that candidates would need to hold more
moderate views in order to get elected, thus providing the incentive (Reilly 2006,
819-20).
In order to promote moderate politics among the parties, Reilly posits a
threshold to be met. As discussed above, Iraq already has a natural threshold that
must be met. The threshold is able to exclude geographically concentrated parties,
as well as block the entry of extremist parties which may try to dictate policies in
the parliament that would be unfavorable for the rest of the Iraq (Reilly 2006,
819). A threshold is at odds with a PR system, which can enable extremist groups
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to gain entry into the Parliament. PR distributes seats according to the number of
votes received. This proportional distribution of seats can lead to ethnic group
security because the ethnic group in question can gain representation and play a
significant role either as a coalition partner or in opposition to the government
(Saideman et al. 2002, 111). Saidman et al. conducted a study which found that PR
tends to have less ethnic conflict than any other system. Minority ethnic groups are
more likely to have some representation in the parliament than in any other
system, which will lead to the ethnic groups members being more satisfied that
there concerns are being met (Saideman et al. 2002, 118).
The goal of the government in Iraq should be to create a moderate form of
govenunent. PR, as explained by Saideman above, does not perform this duty
solely on its own. Since PR allows for any ethnic group, regardless of how
extreme it may be, to gain entry and play a significant role in decision making, PR
may in fact make the current ethnic violence in Iraq worse because of this. The
extremist groups might wish to force their agenda on the rest of the Parliament
when they cannot find a coalition partner. When their demands are not met, they
may still resort to violence. The threshold may have a similar effect, yet it can
keep extremist groups, which may hinder moderating policies, out of the
government. Instead what might occur, and perhaps be more favorable for
moderating policies, is that extremist groups might be able to be incorporated into
a larger party. In the Parliament a larger party may not wish to form a coalition
with the extremist group, but outside of the Parliament the larger party may be
more willing to cooperate with the extremist group. For example a moderate and
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extremist Sunni group may find some common ground outside of the Parliament
and the moderate Sunni group may be keen to incorporate some of the extremist
Sunni group's interest into its party agenda. This might allow for a more moderate
approach that Reilly posits, and that Iraq might need. Thus, despite excluding the
extremist groups from the Parliament, the threshold may have an adverse effect of
creating one or two more moderate parties in the government. In addition to these
moderate parties, other larger parties that cross the established threshold will also
be present in the Parliament.
Combined with the elements discussed above, PR currently creates the best
electoral system for Iraq and also allows for minority rights to be secured. By
being inclusive, it allows for representation of all groups in the country. Further it
allows for fairer representation of women and minorities in the governing
chamber. And finally, as stated earlier, because PR systems encourage alliances,
this means that groups will may be persuaded to take a more moderate approach to
gain votes from different constituencies.
The alternative to the PR system under consideration was the multi-member
majority system that Iraq traditionally used. In this system, several members are
elected from one district. However it is pointed out that this would not have been
possible currently, since it would have required the redefinition of electoral
boundaries into smaller districts (UN: Iraqi Electoral Fact Sheet, 2005). However
once ethnic tensions subside, it may be possible to adopt this system several years
from now.

76
In Iraq the PR system is specifically designed to incorporate minorities into
the government. The TAL requires that at least 25 percent of representation be
women and that there be a fair representation of minorities within the parliament
(TAL, Article 30, section C). Since it encourages groups to form coalitions, PR
provides for power sharing. However, Iraq's PR system may still require
incentives as laid out by Reilly, since the Shi'a will dominate the Council of
Representatives. This will mean that in order to create a firm opposition, the Kurds
and Sunni will need an incentive to cooperate with one another. The Sunni and
Kurds would need to gain allies in the Council of Representatives Chamber to
offset the majority Shi'a, and this may encourage the two groups to take a more
moderate position. The Sunni and the Kurds could not form a majority against the
Shi'a, but together may form a successful opposition. Likewise, the Shi'a may try
to sway the Sunni into an alliance with them to create an Arab majority. What the
outcome will be remains to be seen, but in any case incentives will be needed to
prevent permanent dominance of the Parliament by the Shi'a.

Presidential versus Parliamentary Government
In article 1 of the Iraqi Constitution, the structure of the Iraqi state is laid out
as a single federal state with a republican, representative, parliamentary,
democratic government.

This is further explained in Section 3 of the

Constitution, in which the federal powers are divided among four branches: the
legislative, executive, judicial and independent associations. The legislative branch
is composed of the Council of Representatives (the lower house of Parlian1ent),
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whose members are chosen at a ratio of 1 per 100,000 Iraqi persons, and the
Federation Council (Iraqi Constitution, Article 48). The Federation Council (the
upper house of Parliament) is established as a legislative council that includes
representatives from all regions and the governorates not organized in a region
(Iraqi Constitution Article 65).
Article 78 establishes the Prime Minister as the "direct executive authority
responsible for the general policy of the state and the commander-in-chief of the
armed forces" (Iraqi Constitution, Article 78). The executive branch consists of the
symbolic role of the President of the Republic and the Prime Minister and their
cabinet. The true governing power in the state is the Prime Minister and their
Council of Ministers, which is the Parliamentary Cabinet (Iraqi Constitution 2005,
Article 69). Despite the role the President plays in choosing the Prime Minister
(with Parliamentary approval) the presidency is still established as a nothing more
than a representative of the unity and sovereignty of the state oflraq. He (emphasis
added) guarantees that the Constitution will be followed and preserves Iraq's
'independence and sovereignty' (Iraqi Constitution, Article 66-67). Finally Article
70 establishes that the President is chosen by a two-thirds majority of the Council
of Representatives.
Iraq is clearly a parliamentary style government. In a parliamentary style
government, the executive and legislative authority is fused into one cabinet. The
cabinet leader, the Prime Minister, will then need the support from the parliament
in order to stay in power. In contrast a presidential system has separate legislative
and executive branches, with the executive (president) elected for a fixed term.

78
The president has the authority to oversee and manage the administration, as
opposed to a parliamentary government in which all officials are responsible to the
cabinet headed by the Prime Minister (Riggs 1997, 257). It is assumed that the
bureaucracy can be better administered in a parliamentary system because it is not
dispersed amongst several leaders as in a presidential system, and the leaders of
Parliament can be more powerful since they are better controlled by the fused
power of the regime. Finally, parliamentary government can allow for coalition
governments that can facilitate power-sharing (Lijphart 2002, 49).
The system in place in Iraq was one of a few choices that were available in
the aftermath
of Saddam Hussein's removal from power. The first choice was a
'
collective presidency, as originally outlined in the TAL (the others being a
restoration of the monarchy, and a weak unified presidency). The collective
presidency outlined by the TAL in Chapter 5 included a President of the state and
two deputies. Chosen by a two-thirds majority, the 'Presidency Council'
represented the sovereignty of Iraq and oversaw all higher affairs of the country
(Article 36). As the executive branch, the Presidency Council could veto any
legislation of the National Assembly (the Council of Representatives under the
TAL) within fifteen days of passage (Article 37). Finally, the Prime Minister's
function under the TAL was merely to manage the day-to-day functions of the
National Assembly. The Presidency Council could dismiss the Prime Minister
(Article 41 ).
While the system in place under the TAL may have met the power sharing
element of my framework, there were other problems inherent in it. The main
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example is given in a situation which occurred in Bosnia's shared presidency. In
Bosnia the shared presidency, adopted under the Dayton accords, allots a seat for
each ethnic community to have a seat in the presidential council. However the
system in place in Bosnia meant that each candidate in the shared presidency was
elected only by their ethnic community, and was therefore not beholden to any
other ethnic groups (Dawisha and Dawisha 2003). The problem with the Bosnian
situation is that it has been unable to build the state, and is beset with many
problems. There is no incentive to cooperate among the leaders, and the result is
that the ethnic leaders in the presidency only feel responsible to their respective
communities (Dawisha and Dawisha 2003). A similar situation was likely to occur
in Iraq if the collected presidency continued, with each presidential member likely
to side with their ethnic group. The Shi'a may form ties with Iran, while the Kurds
will look to other Kurdish populations in Turkey, Syria and Iran (Dawisha and
Dawisha 2003).
Although Iraq has a parliamentary government in place, I would like to
examine briefly arguments for and against a presidential system in divided
societies. It is argued that since presidential systems are majoritarian in nature, a
zero-sum gan1e is introduced into politics (Lijphart 2002, 49). This means that
minority parties and representatives are naturally excluded. Further, because
presidential systems have a head of state in a fixed term, they cannot be discharged
by a no-confidence vote (Riggs 1997, 257). It is also possible that gridlock
between competing executive and legislative branches can hamper the ability of
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the government to govern (Riggs 1997, 257). This latter point is particularly
important in a state like Iraq where the goal is to manage conflict.
Other authors such as Frye (2002) and Cheibub (2002) have argued that
presidential systems are better at managing conflict because they can prevent
deadlock, despite what authors such as Riggs would say. As Cheibub argues,
presidential governments are more accountable to their constituents and therefore
will wish to avoid deadlocks (Cheibub 2002, 127-128). However, in the attempt to
avoid deadlocks, some severe compromising may take place resulting in the loss of
certain demands made by groups. This is not necessarily a problem. However my
critique of Frye and Cheibub's arguments, as they apply to a society that is as
divided as Iraq is, is that both authors assume that in a divided society moderate
pluralism will occur. Given the amount of ethnic violence in Iraq, moderate
pluralism is unlikely to occur in the near future. Finally there is an argument that
parliamentarism can be threatening to a minority group if they do not gain
significant representation. In a presidential system however, the ethnic groups may
be safer since there are more ways to block unfavorable actions (Saideman et al.
2002 110-11). Due to the division of powers between the president and legislature,
this allows one branch to check the other, even if one branch dominates the other
(Saideman et al. 2002 110). While these points are valid, one major point still
remains: in a presidential system it is possible for one party to gain a permanent
majority, thereby shutting out a minority completely. The one dominant party
could always ensure that there demands are met and ignore the demands of the
minority. This fact, combined with the fact that presidential systems in general
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concentrate power at the center and rely on majoritarian principles, make it
unlikely to work in Iraq, where the exclusion ofa single ethnic group can lead to
further violence.
The parliamentary government in Iraq is a better choice than a presidential
system because it is better able to meet the criteria for democracy in divided
societies. Since parliamentary governments allow political groups to form
coalitions to gain majorities (or in Iraq's case to gain a sizeable voice to oppose the
Shi'a majority) power sharing amongst the different ethnic groups would occur.
This is the particular strength ofa parliamentary government in Iraq as opposed to
a presidential government. In a presidential-majoritarian government it would be
likely that a Shi'a candidate would always be president due to the overwhelming
majority of the Shi'a.
A parliamentary system meets my proportionality principle and minority
rights criteria because it can allow for the Sunni and Kurdish minority groups to
gain a fairer allotment of seats in the legislative chamber. This is done through
proportional representation which was discussed in the earlier section. Further,
because many parliamentary governments require coalitions in order to form a
majority, this allows for minorities to become part ofthe government. The prime
minister is elected from a majority in parliament, which requires them to
compromise and negotiate with minority parties, thus including them in the
government (Riggs 1997, 270-71). Thus a parlian1cntary system is better at
meeting the criteria in my framework than a presidential system. Despite meeting
most ofthe criteria ofmy framework, Iraq's lack ofa second chamber is a
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drawback. While some fair representation of groups is found in a parliamentary
system, the Shi'a majority necessitate a second house so that the Kurds and Sunni
will have a voice in government.
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CHAPTER V
CONCLUSION

It is no small feat that in a matter of two years Iraq went from a dictatorship
to an electoral democracy. Within this time, a constitution was drawn and an
election held. This is nothing short of remarkable. However, because of the haste
of the American forces to show that democracy had been brought to Iraq, many
considerations were overlooked. The amount of ethnic violence we are now seeing
was underestimated. It appears from the way in which the government was
established that a simple overview of Iraq's history was not performed and lessons
from literature on democracy in divided society were not heeded. The result is a
country that is now in a chaotic state.
This paper has focused on the institutional flaws of Iraq's government, such
as the lack of an electoral system or the lack of a separate chamber in which Iraq's
minority groups such as the Sunni and Kurds can be properly represented.
However, it is further disturbing that so little consideration was given to Iraq's past
democratic tendencies. The informal institutions that are so important to the
maintenance of democracy were undone after May 2003. Further research into
these informal institutions and into Iraq's long standing patronage system are
beyond the scope of this paper but may be necessary to determine there impact on
the formal institutions discussed in this paper.
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My institutional framework discusses how governmental agencies can work
to bring about stability and democracy to Iraq ifproperly worked, but as
demonstrated above, even these are not performing their tasks properly. Autonomy
has been granted, but it does not go far enough. Power sharing can be performed in
Iraq, but the means are not there. Minority rights are established in Chapter 2 of
the Iraqi Constitution, but not represented at the central level ofgovernment.
Finally, despite holding parliamentary elections, no permanent electoral system
has been established in the Constitution, and no means ofequal representation
among the ethnic groups and factions in Iraq are available.
Iraq has a colorful history ofrebellion and violence. But it has also had a
history ofa proud people that wished to break free ofTurkish, Western or a
dictator's dominance. There is a strong desire for freedom and democracy among
the people ofIraq as the high numbers ofvoter turnout indicate. Appropriate
institutions are necessary as this thesis has shown, however they alone are not
sufficient for democracy. The heart ofthis issue lies within institutional design and
ultimately nation building. In Iraq's case there was no natural transition to
democracy, but rather the prior dictatorship ofSaddam Hussein was removed and
the US felt the people of Iraq would accept democracy and the system would
work. As this paper has shown, the construction ofthe institutions was poorly
thought out. Having no prior experience with formal democracy has led to
setbacks that are now being seen, such as a lack ofcooperation among the ethnic
and religious groups at the federal level. When this paper was written in early 2008
institutional design was not appearing to work. However, this is not to say that
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some manipulation and reworking oflraq's governmental institutions would not
lead to a working democracy. This manipulation and reworking of governmental
institutions would certainly evoke nation building, which I feel would not be
welcomed by the Iraqi people, who have consistently opposed outside intervention
into their cow1try as demonstrated in the history section. It remains to be seen what
the future will bring for democracy in Iraq, but based on my observations and
recommendations Iraq's formal governing institutions will need to be thoroughly
reworked to create a lasting and stable democracy.

86
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Al-Marishi, Ibrahim 2005. "Iraq's Constitutional Debate" Middle East Review of
International Affairs. 9, No 3 139-175.
Al-Zainy, M. 1995. The Iraqi Economy Under Saddam Hussein: Development or
Decline. London: Al-Ra fid Publishing Company.
Anderson, Liam and Gareth Stansfield 2004. The Future ofIraq. New York, NY.
Palgrave.
Bashir Sharif, M. 2005. "Islam Hadhari: Concept and Practice."
http://www.islamonline.net/english/Contemporary/2005/03/Article0 l .shtml
(accessed December 1, 2007)
BBC News 2006. "Country Profile: Iraq"
http://news.bbc.eo.uk/2/hi/middle east/country profiles/791014.stm
Biden, J. 2007. "Setting the Record Straight on Federalism in Iraq". from
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/joe-biden/setting-the-record-straig b 66790.html
(accessed October 2, 2007)
Bilici, A. 2007. On Rise in Turkey: Islamism or Democracy? From
http://www.islamonline.net/servlet/Satellite?c=Article C&cid= l 18464936 l 633&p
agename=Zone-English-Muslim Affairs%2FMAELayout (accessed December 1,
2007)
Brown, Nathan. "The Final Draft of the Iraqi Constitution: Analysis and
Commentary''
http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/Fina1Draftof1raqiConstitution1.pdf
(Accessed November 20, 2007)
Chaplin, Edward 2006. "Iraq's New Constitution: Recipe for Stability or Chaos?"
Cambridge Review ofInternational Affairs 19, No. 2 272-284.
Cohen, F. S. 1997. "Proportional versus majoritarian ethnic conflict management in
democracies." Comparative Political Studies, 30(5), 607-631.
Constitution of Iraq, http://www.export.gov/iraq/pdf/iraqi constitution.pdf
(accessed November 13, 2007).
Dahl, Robert 1971. Polyarchy. New Haven: Yale University Press.
Dawisha, Adeed I & Karen Dawisha 2003. "How to Build a Democratic Iraq"
Foreign Affairs

87

Docena, Herbert 2005. "Iraq's Neoliberal Consitution" Foreign Policy in Focus
Dodge, Toby 2003. Inventing Iraq. New York: Columbia University Press.
Esack, Farid. 2005. The Qur'an: A User's Guide. Oxford: Oneworld Publications.
Esman, Milton J 1994. Ethnic Politics. Ithaca, NY: Cornell.
Esman, Milton J and Itamar Rabinovich eds 1988. Ethnicity, Pluralism, and the
State in the Middle East. Ithaca, NY: Cornell.
Freedom House. 2007. Country Report: Iraq. Retrieved Dec. 16, 2007, from
http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=22&country=7197&year=2007
Freedom House. 2007. Country Report: Indonesia. Retrieved Dec. 16, 2007, from
http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=363&year=2007&country= 7195
Freedom House. 2007. Country Report: Turkey. Retrieved Dec. 16, 2007, from
http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=22&year=2007&country=7291
Frye, Timothy 1999. "Presidents, Parliaments, and Democracy: Insights from the
Post-Communist World" In The Architecture of Democracy: Constitutional
Design, Conflict Management and Democracy, ed. Andrew Reynolds, 81-103.
New York, NY: Oxford University Press 2002.
Galbraith, Peter W 2006. The End ofIraq. New York. Simon and Schuster.
Ghai, Yash Pal 1999. "Constitutional Asymmetries: Communal Representation,
Federalism, and Cultural Autonomy." In The Architecture ofDemocracy:
Constitutional Design, Conflict Management and Democracy, ed. Andrew
Reynolds, 141-170. New York, NY: Oxford University Press 2002.
Ghalioun, B. 2004. "The Persistence of Arab Authoritarianism." Journal of
Democracy, 15(4), 126-132.
Gurr, Ted Robert 1993. Minorities at Risk. Washington DC: United States Institute
of Peace Press.
Horowitz, Donald L 2002. "Constitutional Design: Proposals versus Processes" In
The Architecture ofDemocracy: Constitutional Design, Conflict Management and
Democracy, ed. Andrew Reynolds, 15-36. New York, NY: Oxford University
Press.
Horowitz, Donald L 1985. Ethnic Groups in Conflict. Los Angeles, CA:
University of California Press.

88

Hourani, Albert 1991. A History of the Arab Peoples. Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press.
Indonesian Matters. 2005. "Indonesian Democracy and Islam." from
http://www.indonesiamatters.com/43/indonesian-democracy-and-islam/ (accessed
December 1, 2007)
Independent Electoral Commission oflraq. 2004. "IECI Regulation 17/2005 Seat
Allocations". from
http://www.iecirag.org/img/PDF/RulesAndRegulations· English/IECIReg%201705%20-%20Seat%20allocation%20-%20final.pdf (Accessed December 1, 2007)
Iraq Index: Tracking Variables of Reconstruction and Security in Post-Saddam
Iraq http://www3.brookings.edu/fp/saban/irag/index.pdf (accessed October 5,
2007)
Iraq Interim Constitution 1970 http://www.mallat.com/irag%20const%201970.htm
(accessed November 14, 2007)
Jamal A. 2006. Reassessing Support for Islam and Democracy in the Arab World?
Evidence from Egypt and Jordan. World Affairs 169(2):51-64.
Jefferson, Thomas. Jefferson on Politics and Government.
http://etext.lib.virginia.edu/jefferson/guotations/jeff0300.htm (accessed November
24, 2007).
Kymlicka, Will 1995. Multicultural Citizenship, A Liberal Theory of Minority
Rights. Oxford: Clarendon.
Law of Administration for the State oflraq for the Transitional Period (TAL)
http://www.cpa-irag.org/govemment/TAL.html (accessed November 11, 2007)
Ibrahim, A. 2006. "Universal Values and Muslim Democracy". Journal of
Democracy, 17(3), 5-12.
Lijphart, Arend. 1996. "Constitutional Choices for New Democracies" In The
Global Resurgence of Democracy, ed. Diamond and Platter 162-174. John
Hopkins University Press
Lijphart A. 1999. Patterns of Democracy: Government Forms and Performance in
Thirty-Six Countries. London: Yale University Press. 351 p.
Lijphart, Arend 1999. "The Wave of Power-Sharing Democracy" In The
Architecture of Democracy: Constitutional Design, Conflict Management and

89
Democracy, ed. Andrew Reynolds, 37-54. New York, NY: Oxford University
Press 2002.
Lijphart, Arend 1977. Democracy in Plural Societies. New Haven. Yale.
Louis, Wm Roger and Roger Owen 2002. A Revolutionary Year: The Middle East
in 1958. New York, NY. LB. Taurus and Co.
Nordlinger, Eric A 1972. Conflict Regulation in Divided Societies. Harvard:
Center for International Affairs, Harvard University.
Nydell M. 2006. Understanding Arabs. London: Intercultural Press. 260 p.
O'Leary, Brendan 2005. "Power Sharing, Pluralist Federation, and Federacy" in
The Future of Kurdistan in Iraq. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.
Polk, William R 2005. Understanding Iraq. New York, NY: HarperCollins.
Polsby, N. W. 1968. "The Institutionalization of the U.S. House of
Representatives." The American Political Science Review, 62(1), 144-168
Rabie M. 1994. Conflict Resolution and Ethnicity. Westport, CT: Praeger
Publishers. 229 p.
Rabinovich I. 1988. "Arab Political Parties: Ideology and Ethnicity." In: Esman M,
Rabinovich I, editors. Ethnicity, Pluralism, and the State in the Middle East.
London: Cornell University Press. p 155-72.
Reilly, Benjamin 2001. Democracy in Divided Societies: Electoral Engineering
for Conflict Management. New York: Cambridge Press.
Reilly I3. 2006. Political Engineering and Party Politics in Conflict-Prone
Societies. Democratization 13(5):811-27.
Riggs, Fred W 1997. "Presidentialism versus Parliamentarism: Implications for
Representatives and Legitimacy" International Political Science Review 18 253278
Saideman SM, Lanoue DJ, Campini M, Stanton S. 2002. "Democratization,
Political Institutions, and Ethnic Conflict". Comparative Political Studies
35(1):103-29.
Tarlton, Charles D 1965. "Symmetry and Asymmetry as Elements of Federalism:
A theoretical Speculation". The Journal of Politics 27 861-874

90
Tessler M, Moaddel M, Inglehart R. 2006. "What Do Iraqi's Want?" Journal of
Democracy 17(1):38-50.
Tripp, Charles 2000. A History ofIraq. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
United Nations. 2004. "Iraq Electoral Fact Sheet". from
http://www.un.org/news/dh/infocus/irag/election-fact-sht.htm#current (accessed
2007)

